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Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts
and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem
KATRx V. SMYSER*
INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in the number and size of corporate acquisition
transactions financed primarily through the use of debt, commonly referred
to as "leveraged buyouts," has prompted concern for the health of the
businesses involved and for the stability of the depositary institutions and
capital markets which provide financing for these types of acquisitions.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D., 1980, University
of Texas; A.M., 1977, Harvard University; B.A., 1975, Rice University.
Many of my family, friends, colleagues and students have provided valuable assistance
and encouragement for this project. I wish to thank particularly Ann Vanderbeck, for
introducing me to some of the bankruptcy problems associated with leveraged buyouts; Maria
Troegel and Sara Smith for their research assistance; Raymond Nimmer for the time devoted
to discussing and reviewing drafts of this Article; and Craig Smyser for his support and
assistance at every stage of this project.
1. For purposes of this discussion, the term "leveraged buyout" will be used to describe
corporate acquisition transactions financed primarily by debt which is secured either directly
or indirectly by the assets of the entity being acquired. As used here, the term "leveraged
buyout" includes (1) "going private" transactions in which the interests of shareholders of a
public company are purchased by a private investor group, (2) divestiture transactions in which
a subsidiary or division of a public corporation is sold to a private investor group, and (3)
leveraged sales of smaller private companies. In both types of transactions involving public
companies, the purchasing investor group often includes members of the acquired entity's
existing management and in such case the transactions are often referred to as "management
buyouts." The third type of transaction involving the acquisition of a privately held corporation
may exhibit a different dynamic-the current owner will often be selling to a buyer without
access to the financial resources necessary to pay the owner in cash. In such circumstances,
the seller may finance the transaction by agreeing to receive a portion of the purchase price
in the form of debt issued by the company.
The number and size of leveraged buyouts involving public companies have increased
dramatically during the past decade. The "going private" transactions of the mid-1970's tended
to involve smaller companies which had made the transition from private to public ownership
only a few years earlier during a hot market for new issues. Many of these companies found
their stock price particularly depressed during the bear market of the mid-1970's. As a result,
management of these firms, which characteristically held a significant block of stock, found
it attractive to "return to the quiet shores of private life." Lowenstein, No More Cozy
Management Buyouts, 64 HAgv. Bus. REv. 147, 148 (Jan.-Feb. 1986) [hereinafter Lowenstein].
See also Lowenstein, Management Buy-outs, 85 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 730 (1985) [hereinafter
Management Buy-outs].
Although the decade subsequent to this initial flurry of going private transactions has seen
a period of recession and exceptionally high interest rates, followed by a stock market boom
and lower rates, the volume and value of leveraged buyouts has dramatically increased. The
total annual dollar value of leveraged buyouts completed in 1980 was less than $1 billion. In
1984, there were 245 leveraged buyouts valued in the aggregate at more than $18 billion.
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Until recently, discussions of the legal aspects of these transactions focused
primarily on the problem of ensuring fair treatment to shareholders being
Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. Rnv. 73, n.1 (1985); Lowenstein, supra,
at 148. As of 1979, the single largest leveraged buyout was the Houdaille Industries, Inc.
transaction valued at $350 million. Lederman, Leveraged Buy-outs, 11 INsT. ON SEc. RaG.
405, 410 (1979). The size of the Houdaille transaction caught Wall Street's attention. One
buyout expert recalled: "The public documents on-that deal were grabbed up by every firm
on Wall Street.... That showed everybody what could really be done. We all said, 'Holy
mackerel, look at this!' " Sterngold, Buyout Pioneer Quits the Fray, N.Y. Times, June 19,
1987, § 2, at 25, col. 3, at 29, col. 2 (quoting Frank Richardson, President of Wesray Capital,
a major leveraged buyout firm). Multi-billion dollar transactions have appeared in the 1980's-
the leveraged buyout of Beatrice Companies, Inc., organized by Kohlbert, Kravis, Roberts &
Co., was valued at $4.875 billion. Walter & Strasen, Acquisition of Beatrice Companies, Inc.,
64 TAxEs 628 (1986). The 1987 leveraged buyout of Southland Corporation involved $5.1
billion in debt.
Public officials have found the trend alarming. In an address to the New York Financial
Writers Association in June 1984, then Securities Exchange Commission Chairman, John S.
R. Shad cautioned that "the more leveraged takeovers and buyouts today, the more bank-
ruptcies tomorrow." Address by SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad, New York Financial Writers
Ass'n (June 1984), reprinted in 1984 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,634. Similarly, officials
of the Federal Reserve System have warned of the damage to financial institutions which could
result from the bankruptcy of highly leveraged companies. See The Financing of Mergers and
Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1985) (letter from
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker) (suggesting that highly leveraged corporate
acquisitions pose risks to depositary and thrift institutions); Takeovers: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) (statement of Norman Raiden) ("The collapse of a single issue of junk
bonds would have repercussions throughout the entire Federal Savings and Loan Corporations
system."); Tax Aspects of Acquisitions and Mergers. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and the Subcomm. on Selected Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1985) (statement by Preston Martin) (expressing concern
about stability of financial institutions which provide financing for highly leveraged buyouts).
Similar concerns have been expressed by banking and securities firm officials in financial
media reports. See Sloan, Luring Banks Overboard?, FoRBEs, Apr. 9, 1984, at 39; Williams,
Leveraged Buyouts Are Encountering More Resistance from Lenders, Investors, Wall St. J.,
July 25, 1984, at 10, col. 1; Williams, Fearing New Loan Troubles, Banks Start to Sour on
Leveraged Buyouts, Wall St. J., May 8, 1984, at 31, col. 3. See also Sterngold, supra, § 2,
at 25, col. 3 (reporting that Jerome Kohlberg, one of the founding partners of Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co., a leading leveraged buyout firm, was withdrawing from an active role
in the firm at least in part because of concern that the size of leveraged buyouts handled by
the firm was too large, and that Mr. Kohlberg stated he would remain active in smaller
transactions and would "stick with deals where reason still prevails").
Some analysts have suggested, however, tlfat the rise in debt to equity ratios appearing on
corporate balance sheets may not be cause for alarm. See Labick, Is Business Taking on Too
Much Debt?, FoRTUNE, July 22, 1985, at 82 (noting that since the asset values appearing on
corporate balance sheets are in many instances well below market value, the debt to equity
ratio tends to understate the value of shareholder's equity in relation to debt and that as a
result of the decline in interest rates from historic high levels in the early 1980's, interest
payments as a percentage of corporate cash flow have actually fallen in recent years). See also
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 414 (1986) (noting
research indicating that if inflation is taken into account, the average debt to equity ratio of
nonfinancial corporations is roughly comparable to that prior to World War II).
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squeezed out in "going private" transactions2 and on federal tax policies
which encouraged the use of debt financing in corporate acquisitions.3
Recent legal challenges to leveraged buyouts reflect a different concern. In
cases where leveraged buyouts have been followed by the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the acquired company, the financing transactions involved
in the acquisition have been challenged as violative of statutory prohibitions
of fraudulent conveyances. 4 These challenges have focused attention on
another group affected by leveraged buyouts whose interests had heretofore
been largely overlooked-the creditors of the corporate entity involved in
the buyout.
2. The first generation of going private transactions in the mid-1970's prompted a debate
which has continued for more than a decade concerning the problems resulting from the
conflict of interest inherent in management buyouts. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Share-
holder Welfare and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. R-v. 630 (1985); Borden,
Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 987 (1974); Brudney,
Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAF.
L. REv. 1072 (1983); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YAm
L.J. 1354 (1978); Schwartz, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholder
and Enhance the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 489 (1986); Solomon, Going Private:
Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BuIFAIo
L. Ray. 141 (1975); Sommer, "Going Private" A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-
75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,010 (1974); Torres, Minority Shareholder
Protection in Leveraged Buyouts, 13 SEc. REG. L.J. 356 (1986); Comment, The Leveraged
Buyout and Appraisal Rights: Balancing the Interests of Majority and Minority Shareholders,
21 Wu m. M rm L.J. 123 (1985).
3. Historically, tax incentives, principally significant interest deductions and the step-up
in the tax basis of the acquired company's assets, have provided major incentives for leveraged
buyouts. Extraordinary interest deductions provided by such acquisitions have been criticized
for undermining the integrity of the corporate income tax by effectively sanctioning "unres-
tricted ad hoc integration of corporate and shareholder taxation." Canellos, The Overleveraged
Acquisition, 39 TAX LAw. 91 (1985). The repeal of the "General Utilities" doctrine in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 effectively removes the incentive for leveraged buyouts derived from
the step-up in basis permitted to the acquirer under General Utilities.
4. See United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (Gleneagles
I); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 571 F. Supp. 935, (1983) (Gleneagles II); United
States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584 F. Supp. 671 (1984) (Gleneagles III), affd sub nom. United
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986) (obligation and security
interest of lender invalidated as fraudulent conveyance under Pennsylvania law). See also
Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (leveraged buyout
not fraudulent conveyance); In re Knox Kreations, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1979),
aff'd, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981) (leveraged buyout did not render company insolvent,
therefore guaranty given to selling shareholders was not fraudulent conveyance); In re Anderson
Indus., 55 Bankr. 922 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (money received by selling shareholders in leveraged
buyout recovered for benefit of estate under Michigan fraudulent conveyance law).
Newspaper and periodical reports indicate that these types of claims are being asserted
with increasing frequency and are causing concern not only among the lawyers involved in
counseling the parties to leveraged buyouts but to investors as well. Cook & Schwartz, At a
Troubled Company, Officers and Directors Owe Creditors First, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1987,
at 22, col. 1; Smith, Shareholder Risks in Leveraged Buyouts Ride on Fear of Bankruptcy-
Law Filings, Wall St. J., July 25, 1984, at 10, col. 1; Victor, Leveraged Buyout Alleged as
Fraud in Bankruptcy Case, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
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Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson have criticized the appli-
cation of fraudulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts5 on the
grounds that fraudulent conveyance statutes, as the descendants of sixteenth
century laws enacted to prevent collusive transfers between individual debtors
and their families and friends, should be construed narrowly and should.
apply only to invalidate sham transactions and gratuitous transfers. 6 Pro-
fessors Baird and Jackson argue that fraudulent conveyance statutes should
not affect any "arms-length ' 7 transactions, even if such transactions injure
creditors. 8 Applying these general principles concerning the proper scope of
fraudulent conveyance law, Professors Baird and Jackson conclude that
leveraged buyouts should be categorically excluded from the application of
fraudulent conveyance statutes, because "[a] firm that incurs obligations in
the course of a buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat
who sells his sheep to his brother for a pittance." 9
This Article sets forth several propositions. First, it contends that the
conclusion of Professors Baird and Jackson, that the application of fraud-
ulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts is not in the best interests
of creditors, fails to comprehend fully the distinctive potential for harm to
creditors in those leveraged buyout transactions occurring under circum-
stances which trigger the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes.
Second, this Article argues that the application of fraudulent conveyance
statutes to leveraged buyouts which occur under such circumstances is
consistent with the policies underlying traditional applications of fraudulent
conveyance statutes and is both necessary and appropriate to afford creditors
protection against transactions which are the functional equivalent of trans-
actions generally prohibited under state corporation laws. Finally, it con-
cludes that the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to invalidate
the loan transaction underlying a leveraged buyout is not unfair to the
third-party lender.
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND CREDITORS' INTERESTS
The basic structure of a leveraged buyout involves a transfer of corporate
ownership financed primarily by borrowings made directly or indirectly by
the target corporation and secured by that entity's assets. The proceeds of
the borrowings are advanced to the purchasers who use the funds to pay
5. Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L.
Ray. 829 (1985).
6. Id. at 840.
7. Id. at 854.
8. Id. at 833-35.
9. Id. at 852.
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the purchase price owed to the selling shareholders.10 In practice, leveraged
buyouts occur in many different contexts. The largest leveraged buyouts
tend to involve "going-private" transactions in which shareholders in a
public corporation sell their stock to a private investor group, often com-
prised principally of management, who finance their purchase with debt.
However, leveraged buyout techniques have also been used to finance
divestitures in which a private investment group acquires a division or
subsidiary of a public corporation, and in situations in which a smaller
private company's shareholders sell their interest to new ownership having
no previous connection with the venture.
Regardless of the context in which a leveraged buyout occurs, the trans-
actions present basically the same questions with respect to the application
of fraudulent conveyance statutes. In all of the above cases, there are two
essential characteristics which identify the transaction as a leveraged buyout.
First, the purchaser acquires the funds necessary for the acquisition through
borrowings secured directly or indirectly by the assets of the company being
acquired. Second, the lender who provides such funds is looking primarily
to the future operating earnings of the acquired company and/or to the
proceeds from future sales of assets of the company, rather than to any
other assets of the purchasers, to repay the borrowings used to effect the
acquisition. 12 A leveraged buyout generally results in the substitution of a
10. Although leveraged buyouts may be stiictured in a number of different ways, the most
common form is the cash merger. The acquisition group forms two new corporations, a parent
company and a wholly owned subsidiary. The subsidiary borrows the money necessary for the
acquisition, either through bank financing, loans from other institutional lenders, and/or public
issuance of debt (so-called "junk bonds") and is merged into the company to be acquired.
The proceeds of these borrowings are paid to the selling shareholders of the company being
acquired and the assets of the acquired venture are pledged to secure the acquisition debt. In
some instances the borrowings are made at the parent company level with the assets of the
acquired venture secured for the benefit of the acquisition lenders through upstream guaranties.
Lederman, supra note 1, at 409.
Professor Carlson has described a number of structural variations in leveraged buyout
transactions, but for purposes of the discussion of the possible fraudulent conveyance liability
stemming from such transactions, the critical common factor is the use of the acquired entity's
assets to secure the acquisition debt, either directly through mortgages and security interests
or indirectly through secured guaranties. Carlson, supra note 1, at 81-83.
11. The acquiring entity in a leveraged buyout is almost always a private as opposed to a
publicly held venture. Few public companies can afford the significantly increased debt
associated with such transactions without affecting their credit ratings. In addition, the increased
interest expense and depreciation resulting from these transactions, although attractive from a
tax standpoint, reduce earnings and depress the acquiring company's stock price. Lederman,
supra note 1, at 412; Sloan, supra note 1, at 39.
12. Leveraged buyout investors thus generally view cash flow, the money available for
working capital and debt service, as the most important factor in assessing a potential buyout
candidate. Wolske, Playing by the Numbers, How to Size Up a Potential LBO, BARRON's,
Feb. 17, 1986, at 18. Mature companies with a history of stable earnings and modest capital
expenditure projections have traditionally been the most attractive leveraged buyout candidates.
Ferenbach, L.B.O.s: A New Capital Market (And How to Cope with It), MERGERS &
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significant amount of new debt in the place of equity in the corporation's
capital structure. In transactions where banks or other institutional lenders
provide the major portion of the debt financing, this new debt is likely to
be senior secured debt. Thus, by definition, leveraged buyouts adversely
affect existing creditors of the company by reducing the assets available for
the satisfaction of the obligations owed to them.' 3
In arguing that this detrimental impact on creditors is not within the
compass of injuries which fraudulent conveyance statutes are intended to
remedy, Professors Baird and Jackson begin from the premise that the
principal function of "per se" or "off the rack" rules such as fraudulent
conveyance statutes14 is to "provide all the parties [to a transaction] with
the type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had the time
AcQUISITIONS, Fall 1983, at 21 ("The characteristics generally sought in an l.b.o. are by now
well known: slow growth, steady earnings, mature business, . . . solvent financial condition
...."). See also Adkins, Why Leveraged Buyouts Are Getting Riskier, 123 DuN's Bus.
MONTH, Apr. 1984, at 33, 34. Adkins states:
Leveraged buyouts that have a good chance of succeeding generally share a
number of characteristics .... [L]enders and investors are advised to look for
a company that is a low-cost producer in its industry, has a stable and predictable
growth pattern, makes a product that is either a leader or has a special niche in
its market and has a diversified customer base .... It is also advisable to avoid
companies with a high level of future capital requirements ....
Id. A consistent pattern of high earnings is desirable because firms with substantial debt
charges have little tolerance for revenue fluctuations. Firms having stable revenues can tolerate
a higher ratio of interest to total expenses. See Mendelson, The Threat of Corporate Debt, 6
J. Comp. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET LAW 149, 155 (1984).
As the popularity and the prices of leveraged buyouts have increased, however, there have
been an increasing number of more aggressive transactions, in which the projected cash flow
was insufficient to cover the acquisition debt. For example, the prospectus relating to the $647
million leveraged buyout of Dr. Pepper projected that following the buyout, the company
would have a ratio of earnings to fixed charges of .7 to 1. Sloan, supra note 1, at 43. Such
transactions are viable only because the lenders and investors involved expect to use revenue
from the sale of some of the acquired company's assets to reduce the heavy burden of the
acquisition debt, in effect a partial liquidation, or to seek an additional infusion of equity
capital to pay down the debt through quickly taking the company public again, thus betting
that improved stock market conditions will bail them out of this precarious financial posture.
Accurate predictions as to the market value of corporate assets or divisions is often critical to
structuring a successful buyout. See Southland Corp. Buyout to Force Some Unit Sales, Wall
St. J., July 7, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
13. Any transaction which involves an increase in a corporation's debt to equity ratio has
an adverse impact on existing creditors by increasing the risk of default. McDaniel, supra note
1, at 418; Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REv.
499, 504 n.14 (1976).
14. In describing the constructive fraud provisions of section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) (referred to throughout this Article as UFCA), and
the analogous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982), Baird and
Jackson use the terms "per se" and "off the rack" to emphasize that these rules operate to
constrain the conduct of parties to a credit transaction in addition to whatever specific terms
they may choose to include in the contract relating to the transaction. Baird & Jackson, supra
note 5, at 831, 836 n.21.
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and money to bargain over all aspects of their deal."' 5 Fraudulent convey-
ance statutes should therefore be interpreted to restrain only those types of
debtor conduct which creditors, analyzing the terms of their relationship
with the debtor in advance of the questioned conduct, would almost always
want to prohibit. Professors Baird and Jackson thus ask whether the parties
to a consensual credit transaction, operating under ideal circumstances,
would normally agree to include in their contract a provision restricting the
debtor's ability to engage in a leveraged buyout to the same extent fraudulent
conveyance statutes restrict this activity.16
15. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 835-36. Judge Posner has described the function of
an efficient corporation law in determining the rights of creditors in a similar manner.
To the extent that the terms implied by corporation law accurately reflect the
normal desires of transacting parties, they reduce the cost of transactions. The
criterion of an efficient corporation law is therefore whether the terms do in fact
reflect commercial realities, so that transacting parties are generally content with
them .... Thus a corporation law is inefficient if it fails to provide standard
implied contract terms that afford creditors the sort of protection against default
that they would normally insist upon in an express negotiation.
Posner, supra note 13, at 506-07.
As applied to corporate, as opposed to individual debtors, fraudulent conveyance statutes
compliment the creditor protection provisions contained in state corporation statues. See infra
notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
16. Baird and Jackson generally take the position that for purposes of determining the
proper scope of per se rules such as the fraudulent conveyance remedy, it is unnecessary to
distinguish between the interests of consensual creditors and non-consensual creditors, such as
tort claimants and taxing authorities, because "the limits that consensual creditors would
impose on investments by a debtor also largely will protect nonconsensual claimants . .. ."
Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 835 n.20. Indeed since a company must always comply
with the most stringent terms and covenants contained in any of the contracts governing any
of its debt obligations, all creditors, even those consensual creditors who lack significant
leverage in negotiating the terms of their credit arrangement with the company and non-
consensual creditors, benefit from these covenants. See McDaniel, supra note 1, at 435. This
does not mean that the creditors who are in a position to have the greatest leverage in their
negotiations with the debtor have an actual incentive to protect the interests of other creditors.
For example, an institutional lender who negotiates a secured position may rely on this security
interest to protect itself against loss in the event of default and thus have little interest in
negotiating covenants regarding the debtor's overall financial condition. In addition, as a more
general matter, it would seem that the interests of non-consensual creditors would be protected
by the negotiations of the consensual creditors only to the extent the non-consensual creditors
enjoy a position of priority over (or at least parity with) the consensual creditors. Otherwise
the priority afforded the consensual creditors would reduce these creditors' risks relative to
that to which the non-consensual creditors are exposed and would encourage the consensual
creditors to negotiate provisions which would be inadequate to protect the non-consensual
creditors.
Under certain circumstances, a creditor aware of risks associated with a particular loan
may not explicitly negotiate a contractual covenant in order to protect itself against these risks
but may simply negotiate a higher interest rate to compensate for the risk. Such a strategy
protects only the creditor who negotiates for the higher rate and may in fact be harmful to
the interests of other creditors. See Posner, supra note 13, at 506. Thus, with respect to the
more specific risks to creditors posed by leveraged buyouts, it may be necessary to recognize
potential conflicts of interests among different classes of creditors. Baird and Jackson suggest
that the identity of interest among creditors of a company involved in a leveraged buyout may
1988]
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Professors Baird and Jackson conclude that the parties would not -gen-
erally include such a provision, in spite of the potential for injury to
creditors resulting from leveraged buyouts.17 This conclusion rests on the
premise that even under ideal negotiating circumstances creditors do not
seek to protect themselves against all debtor transactions that could poten-
tially injure creditors, but only against those transactions which almost
always result in injury, such as gratuitous transfers. Because leveraged
buyouts are not the types of transactions which creditors are likely to
perceive as carrying a high degree of probability of injury to creditors,
Professors Baird and Jackson argue that creditors would not seek a con-
tractual provision restricting a debtor's ability to engage in such transac-
tions.'8 Professors Baird and Jackson conclude that creditors would not
consistently want to bar debtors from entering into leveraged buyouts
because "these transactions do not always seem to be clearly to the detriment
of creditors, nor did we always see creditors treating such transactions as
events of default in their loan agreements, even before the issue was moved
to the domain of fraudulent conveyance law." 19
This observation misperceives the relationship between "per se" rules
such as fraudulent conveyance laws and specifically negotiated contractual
provisions. Professors Baird and Jackson also fail to recognize that although
the use of the term "leveraged buyout" and the exponential increase in the -
number and size of leveraged buyouts began in the late 1970's, transactions
of this type, and legal challenges to such transactions based on fraudulent
conveyance statutes, antedate the current boom. In an earlier era, transac-
tions very much like the leveraged buyouts of the 1970's and 1980's were
referred to as "bootstrap acquisitions.''20 Some of these transactions were
invalidated on the basis of fraudulent conveyance statutes.2 1 In view of this
be limited to the extent that certain creditors, particularly those having secured claims, may
be able to avoid exposure to the risk created by the buyout by ensuring that they are cashed
out at the time of the transaction. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 854.
17. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 853-54.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 853.
20. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HAxv. L. REV.
505, 511 n.18 (1977).'
21. See Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla.), aff'd, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir.
1968); In re Process Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. IIL. 1964), rev'd on juris.
grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 957 (1967); I.G. GLENN,
FRAuDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PRFERENCFS § 283 (1940).
These earlier "bootstrap" transactions most commonly involved situations in which the
selling shareholders provided the leverage necessary for the acquisition by taking a note for a
significant portion of the purchase price. In these cases, the corporation's assets were pledged
to secure, or used to discharge, the debt owed to the selling shareholders. Courts applied
fraudulent conveyance statutes, the doctrine of equitable subordination, or both, to invalidate
transfers of corporate assets made in connection with the "bootstrap" transaction and to
subordinate the claims associated with these transactions to the claims of other creditors.
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history, and in view of the fact that from a creditor's point of view a
leveraged buyout is functionally indistinguishable from other types of con-
duct by corporate debtors which are restricted by other "per se" rules
established for the benefit of creditors, the absence of specific contractual
provisions restricting leveraged buyout transactions in loan agreements or
bond indentures does not support a conclusion that creditors generally do
not expect protection from the risks associated with these transactions.
Creditors negotiate specific contractual protection, and incur the costs
associated with this process, only when they assume that the applicable
law-that is, the relevant body of per se rules-does not protect them
against a particular risk. To do otherwise would be inefficient and redun-
dant. 22 Thus, the absence of specific contractual provisions restricting lev-
eraged buyouts is as likely to reflect a belief that the per se rules embodied
in fraudulent conveyance statutes would normally protect creditors against
the risks of a leveraged buyout as a belief that creditors do not desire such
protection.
In support of their conclusion that creditors generally would be willing
to accept the risk of injury posed by a leveraged buyout, Professors Baird
and Jackson observe that a credit transaction creates an inherent conflict
of interest between debtor and creditor.23 The debtor, they reason, is much
more inclined to take risks with borrowed money because "[hie enjoys all
the benefits if a risky venture proves successful, but he does not incur all
the costs if the venture fails." 24 By contrast, a creditor is adversely affected
any time the debtor engages in a transaction which has the effect of
exchanging a safe and liquid asset, such as the cash proceeds of a loan,; for
a more speculative and less liquid asset, such as real property or equipment.?
22. See Posner, supra note 13, at 506.
23. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 834. When considering this general conflict of
interest between a debtor and its creditors in the context of a corporate debtor, the conflict
is between the equity holders (who control management) and the creditors. See Smith &
Warner, On Financial Contracting, 7 J. FiN. ECON. 117, 118 (1979) (They note that with
respect to one important class of corporate creditors-bondholders- "management, acting in
the stockholders' interest, has incentives to design the firm's operating characteristics ... in
ways which benefit stockholders to the detriment of bondholders.").
24. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 834. Once debt is issued, the equity interests have
an incentive to choose a riskier investment strategy than anticipated by the debt holder in
determining the price at which he was willing to lend to the company at the outset of the
transaction. By taking the riskier "high variance project [the equity holder] can transfer wealth
from the (naive) bondholders to himself .... ." Jensen & Meckling, Agency Costs and the
Theory of the Firm, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305, 335 (1976).
25. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 834. Smith and Warner identify "asset substitution,"
defined as management decisions to alter the investment of the firm's assets by exchanging
low risk assets for riskier investments-that is, assets having a higher "variance rate"-as one
of the major sources of conflict of interest between stockholders and creditors. Smith &
Warner, supra note 23, at 117-19. The other major tensions between the interests of creditors
and equity holders revolve around (I) dividend payments, (2) claim dilution through issuance
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Thus, debtors and creditors often have different attitudes towards the
debtor's undertaking of a particular venture.
Nonetheless, creditors expect a debtor to make investment decisions and
to take risks. As Professors Baird and Jackson note, "[c]reditors lend
money in the first instance because the debtor has entrepreneurial skills that
they do not have." 26 In fact, the debtor must exercise these entrepreneurial
skills and take certain risks in order to make the credit transaction a
successful one from the creditor's point of view. Suppose, for example, a
debtor simply invested the loan proceeds in government securities or placed
them in a bank account. Under these circumstances, the creditor faces very
little risk of loss of principal. Assuming, however, that the rate of interest
paid on these securities in the bank account is less than the interest rate
the borrower pays in a commercial lending transaction, the debtor would
be unable to cover his interest payments on the loan from the earnings on
his investment and this would not be satisfactory from either the debtor's
or the creditor's point of view. If the creditor expected to receive only this
lower rate of return, he could have purchased government securities or
deposited the funds in a bank directly instead of lending them to the debtor.
In order to take advantage of the debtor's entrepreneurial skills and earn
the higher interest rates typically paid in a commercial lending transaction,
the creditor must allow the debtor a certain degree of freedom concerning
the manner in which the debtor will invest the borrowed assets and must
accept the risk associated with the debtor's investment decisions. As Pro-
fessors Baird and Jackson put it, "[a] creditor would not want to impose
all possible restraints upon a debtor, even if the absence of a restraint
exposes that creditor to the risk that the debtor will injure it."27
From this premise that creditors willingly accept some degree of risk that
transactions by the debtor will adversely affect them, Professors Baird and
Jackson argue that a creditor would not favor a contractual provision or
"off the rack" rule permitting creditors to invalidate retrospectively any
transaction by the debtor which ultimately turned out to be unprofitable.
Such a legal constraint, they argue, would paralyze the debtor and render
him incapable of exercising his entrepreneurial skills for the benefit of both
creditor and debtor. In view of the value of the debtor's risk taking and
of additional debt of senior or equal rank, and (3) under investment situations in which
management has an incentive to reject projects having a positive net present value if, given
the firm's financial condition, the benefit from the investment would accrue to the bondholders.
This latter risk will occur when the firm has a negative net worth. In determining the price
of a bond (or other extension of-credit), the bond market (or other type of creditor) makes
an estimate of management's probable future investment behavior. Any unanticipated invest-
ment strategy occurring after the issuance of the bonds therefore results in a transfer of wealth
from the bondholders to the stockholders. Id.
26. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 834.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 833-35.
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investment activity to both the creditor and the debtor, Professors Baird
and Jackson argue that an interpretation of fraudulent conveyance statutes
which would permit the creditors of an insolvent debtor to overturn any
transactions by the debtor merely upon a showing that such a transaction
eventually resulted in the creditors as a group being worse off is overbroad
because it prohibits useful and potentially beneficial transactions that cred-
itors would not generally want to preclude.29 Although Professors Baird
and Jackson concede that a leveraged buyout may have an adverse impact
on the existing creditors of the company involved in the buyout, they argue
that the nature and extent of this risk are no different from that associated
with "many ordinary transfers that a debtor makes." 30 Thus, in Professors
Baird and Jackson's view, the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes
to invalidate the financing transactions underlying a leveraged buyout is
unwarranted.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF LIMITING CIRCUMSTANCES:
INSOLVENCY AND FAIR CONSIDERATION
Professors Baird and Jackson's argument is premised on a laissez faire
approach which views fraudulent conveyance statutes as a paternalistic
interference with freedom of contract. They consider such interference
inconsistent with the best interests of creditors as well as debtors and
conclude that an unfettered creditor would not favor the application of
fraudulent conveyance laws to leveraged buyouts. This conclusion rests on
an analysis that is incomplete in two important respects. First, Professors
Baird and Jackson fail to consider carefully the extent to which the fraud-
ulent conveyance statutes, by limiting the application of the constructive
fraud provisions to transfers for inadequate consideration made under
circumstances of insolvency, or near insolvency, restrict the statutes' appli-
cation to transactions which creditors would in fact generally find objec-
tionable. Second, Professors Baird and Jackson fail to analyze the underlying
financial dynamics of leveraged buyouts and thus ignore the serious potential
for abuse of creditors inherent in leveraged buyouts of financially troubled
companies. In short, Professors Baird and Jackson overestimate the restric-
tive impact of fraudulent conveyance statutes and underestimate the severity
of the risks to creditors. A careful analysis of the application of fraudulent
conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts and of the financial impact of
such transactions on creditors dictates the conclusion that rational creditors
generally would favor the application of fraudulent conveyance laws to
leveraged buyouts.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 834.
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Two factors limit the application of the constructive fraud3 provisions
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA). First, these provisions
apply only to transfers made when a debtor's financial circumstances are
exceptionally precarious or become so as a result of the challenged convey-
ance. Specifically, the constructive fraud provisions apply only to transfers
made by a person "who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent"3 2 and to
transfers made by a person engaging "in a business or transaction for which
the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably
small capital."' 33 Second, the constructive fraud provisions do not invalidate
all transactions made by debtors under these circumstances but only those
in which the financially strapped debtor receives less than fair consideration
in exchange for the conveyance of property. Thus, the constructive fraud
provisions of the UFCA only apply to a limited category of debtor trans-
actions which adversely affect creditors under certain circumstances of
financial exigency.
These limitations cannot be overlooked in speculating about what types
of per se rules restricting debtor conduct creditors may favor. Although
creditors may very well oppose a per se rule which restrains all transactions
by a debtor having an adverse impact on creditors, creditors might well
have a different response to a per se rule which operates to restrain only
31. Baird and Jackson apparently have no objection to invalidating the transactions
constituting a leveraged buyout if the transaction was undertaken with actual intent to defraud
creditors. They object only to the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to "arms-
length" transactions entered "in the ordinary course." Id. at 854-55.
32. Section 4 of the UFCA provides that "[e]very conveyance made and every obligation
incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors
without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred
without a fair consideration." UFCA, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985). The analogous provision of the
Bankruptcy Codeis section 548 which empowers the trustee to avoid any transfer or obligation
made or incurred by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of the petition if the debtor
"received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation",
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982), and the debtor "was insolvent on the date such transfer was
made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation," 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(B)(i) (1982). Under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy trustee is also entitled to assert the rights which creditors of the bankrupt would
have under the applicable state fraudulent conveyance laws. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982). As a
result, when the debtor is in bankruptcy, both state law fraudulent conveyance claims and
section 548 claims may be made by the trustee.
33. UFCA § 5, 7A U.L.A. 427, 504 (1985). Section 5 of the UFCA provides that:
Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it is
engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property
remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during
the continuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual
intent.
Id. The analogous provision of the Bankruptcy Code is 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982),
which entitles the trustee to set aside a transfer or obligation if the debtor "was engaged in
business, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining
with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital." Id.
[Vol. 63:781
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
certain types of transactions occurring under the limited circumstances
specified in fraudulent conveyance statutes.
The following examples illustrate the point. Any transaction in which a
debtor receives less than fair consideration diminishes the total value of a
debtor's estate. Although everyone having an interest in the estate, creditor
and equity holder alike, may be unhappy about such a development, the
creditor's concerns are not likely to be extremely serious so long as the
debtor remains solvent. If the debtor is not insolvent at the time of the
transfer, or is not left insolvent or inadequately capitalized, the persons
owning the residual equity interest in the debtor will bear the more direct
impact of any loss associated with the transaction. Although the transaction
injures the creditor in the sense that the cushion between the level of debt
and the value of the debtor's assets has been diminished somewhat, the
debtor still retains assets sufficient to discharge his debts.1
4
For example, suppose a corporation, D, has assets of $1,000,000 and
liabilities of $250,000. D acquires a tract of real estate for $500,000 cash.
An independent appraiser's estimate of the property's fair market value is
$250,000, but D agrees to pay twice that amount because of the recent
discovery of valuable mineral deposits on an adjacent tract. The management
of D believes that if similar reserves are found on this property, its value
would be at least $1,000,000. Although this transaction may have an adverse
impact on D's creditors by reducing the company's net worth if the estimate
of the property's actual value turns out to be erroneous, D's creditors might
not want to restrain the company's ability to enter into such a transaction.
Under these circumstances, even if the property is ultimately found to be
worth only $250,000, D would still have sufficient assets to discharge its
obligations. The owner of the equity interest in D will bear the loss on the
real estate transaction. Before the real estate transaction the shareholders'
equity was $750,000. After the transaction this equity has been reduced to
$250,000. By contrast, of course, if D's management turns out to be correct
about the property's actual value, the creditors' position would be improved
only in a similarly indirect way. If the property turns out to be worth more
than $500,000, the equity holders in D would be the principal beneficiaries
of the advantageous transaction. Thus, D's creditors are not likely to have
a strong interest in deterring this transaction even though it may have some
indirect adverse impact on them by reducing the company's net worth.
34. See Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L.
REv. 667, 733 (noting that one of the reasons the law does not impose on corporate management
fiduciary duties to protect the interests of bondholders akin to those owed to equity holders
is that "so long as the corporate debtor remains able to repay the debt, creditors' interests




Compare, however, the impact of such a transaction on D's creditors if
the company were insolvent at the time of the real estate purchase or became
insolvent as a result. Assume the facts in the example given above are
changed so that at the outset, D has $750,000 in liabilities and $775,000 in
assets and enters into the real estate transaction described above, borrowing
$500,000 cash on a priority secured basis and pledging not only the property
being acquired but additional assets as well. Now, if the property purchased
turns out to have a value of only $250,000, D will have liabilities of
$1,250,000, well in excess of the value of D's assets-1,025,000. Under
these circumstances, the adverse impact of the transaction on D's creditors
is much more direct and substantial. Although one might reasonably con-
clude that creditors would not necessarily want to restrain the real estate
transaction under the first set of circumstances discussed above, it seems
unlikely that creditors would take the same point of view with respect to
the latter example.
Changes in the corporation's financial condition which enhance the like-
lihood of insolvency magnify dramatically the basic conflict of interest
between creditor and debtor. For as a corporate debtor's financial situation
deteriorates to the point of near insolvency, the holders of the equity interest
and the management they control have less and less to lose and therefore
may be more inclined to engage in riskier deals. When, for example, a firm
has a high debt to equity ratio, stockholders have a greater incentive to
invest the firm's assets in high risk projects. In extreme circumstances,
stockholders may even have an incentive to pursue an investment strategy
which reduces rather than maximizes the net present value of the firm.35
For example, stockholders may refuse an investment opportunity which
promises a safe return of $45 on an initial $40 investment and pursue
instead a different, riskier project which costs $40 and offers a risk-adjusted
return of $35 (e.g., a project having a 50% chance of paying $60 and a
50% chance of paying only $10). Assuming that the value of the stock-
holder's equity is relatively small, the stockholders will be attracted by the
riskier project because if it succeeds they will receive most of the gain, but
if it fails the creditors will bear the brunt of the loss. 36 Under such
circumstances, the creditors' perspective may shift in the opposite direction;
creditors will become more anxious to restrain risky behavior by the debtor
because the creditors will be bearing more and more of the loss. Creditors
may also become less sanguine about a debtor's risk-taking under these
circumstances because the creditors' expectations with respect to the trans-
35. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24, at 344-45; McDaniel, supra note 1, at 418. See
also R. BRa.EAY & S. MYEns, Pai~ci'.as oF CoRPoAT FINANCE 396-97 (2d ed. 1984).
Another numerical illustration of this creditor-stockholder conflict appears in E. F mA & M.
MILLER, TiE TBHoRY OF FINANCE 179-80 (1972).
36. Bratton, supra note 34, at 733.
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action may change. At some point creditors may be less concerned with
making a significant profit on the credit transaction than with merely
assuring the safe return of principal.
Limiting the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to circum-
stances of insolvency reflects a logical assessment of a change in circum-
stances which transforms the inherent conflict of interest between debtor
and creditor present from the outset of every credit transaction into a much
more serious conflict. The use of insolvency as a trigger for liability in the
fraudulent conveyance statutes represents a determination that under cir-
cumstances of insolvency the risk of misconduct by those in control of a
corporate debtor becomes so great that it is appropriate to afford creditors
the benefit of a per se rule restricting the corporation's conduct. 7 Thus,
while a per se rule permitting creditors to invalidate any transaction by a
debtor which may have an adverse impact on creditors by reducing the total
value of assets available to satisfy their claims may well be overbroad, this
conclusion says very little about the "proper scope" of fraudulent convey-
ance law because it fails to consider the degree to which the requirement
of insolvency works to avoid overbreadth. The insolvency threshold limits
the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to precisely those extraor-
dinary circumstances in which creditors are likely to oppose the challenged
conveyance before it is made.
In determining whether fraudulent conveyance statutes should be appli-
cable to leveraged buyouts, one cannot overlook the impact that insolvency
will have on a creditor's analysis of the cost of constraining debtor conduct
of this type as compared to the possible benefit to be derived from such
transactions. Creditors will generally desire to restrain a debtor's conduct
more tightly under circumstances of insolvency or near insolvency. Thus,
even if one accepts Professors Baird and Jackson's basic premise-that
fraudulent conveyance doctrine should operate only to invalidate those
37. See McDaniel, supra note 1, at 419-20. See also Posner, supra note 13, at 509 n.22;
Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1211-12 (1984) (arguing that because
a corporation's precarious financial posture increases the incentive for the equity interest to
engage in risky ventures, holders of the company's debt securities and other long term creditors
should under such circumstances be represented on the board so that the creditors may exercise
more direct control over the risks to which they are exposed). Jensen and Meckling analogize
the risk taking proclivity of the management representatives of the equity interest in a highly
leveraged firm to the strategy which would be employed by an individual playing poker on
money borrowed at a fixed interest rate, with the player's liability limited to a very small
stake. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24, at 334 n.39.
There is at least one case providing dramatic empirical evidence of this gambler mentality.
See In re Tri-State Paving, Inc., 32 Bankr. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (individuals who were
the sole officers, directors and stockholders of a nearly insolvent corporation withdrew all
funds from the corporation's bank account to finance a trip to Las Vegas in an effort to win
enough money to pay the corporation's creditors, and the bankruptcy court rejected the
defendants' claims that they were entitled to the funds as salary payments and concluded that
the withdrawals were fraudulent transfers).
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categories of transactions which creditors would almost always want to
prohibit-the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to encompass
all transfers in which the debtor received less than "fair consideration" (as
defined by the statute) occurring under the limiting circumstances of finan-
cial exigency set out in the statute seems likely to be more consistent with
creditors' desires than Professors Baird and Jackson concede.
Professors Baird and Jackson's analysis focuses on the conflict between
creditor and equity holder with respect to investment of the company's
assets. It is important to note however, that there are other major sources
of conflict between equity holders and creditors which may encourage
creditors to favor a per se rule restricting leveraged buyouts."5 These
conflicts, like the conflict concerning entrepreneurial decisions, are exacer-
bated when the corporation's financial condition deteriorates.
Any transaction which results in a distribution of corporate assets, or of
the value of such assets, to shareholders is adverse to the interests of
creditors because such a transfer reduces the assets otherwise available to
satisfy creditors' claims. In addition, such transfers benefit equity holders
directly. These decisions, unlike the entrepreneurial decisions discussed above,
are not attractive to the equity interests because they have the potential to
benefit the equity holders by increasing the value of their residual ownership
interest in the firm, but because they permit the equity holder to realize
some of this value for personal use. Distributions directly increase stock-
holders' personal wealth, not just the value of their interest in the firm.
Distributions also insulate this wealth from any further exposure to the risk
of the corporation's financial performance. Of course, it would be unwise
and impractical for creditors to attempt to restrict all distributions. So long
as the firm is relatively profitable, the stockholders will be somewhat
constrained in declaring distributions by their own self-interested desire to
increase the value of the firm. 39
As in the case of the conflict produced by entrepreneurial decisions, this
second conflict between equity holders and creditors is exacerbated if the
38. See supra note 21.
39. Specifically, management attentive to stockholder interests will have an incentive to
distribute to stockholders, in the form of a cash dividend or other distribution or a stock
redemption or repurchase, the value of all assets which may be invested elsewhere for a higher
rate of return than the corporation is able to earn on these assets. By contrast, bondholders
and other creditors would favor the corporation's retention of all capital which it could invest
for even a small positive return, regardless of whether such capital could be invested more
profitably elsewhere. See Bratton, supra note 34, at 668 n.3.
Stockholder and creditor interests with respect to the reinvestment as opposed to the
distribution of the firm's earnings in the enterprise are nonetheless fairly congruent so long as
the net present value of projected returns on the company's investment exceeds the cost of
capital raised from an external source. Id. at 756. See also Brudney, Dividends, Discretion
and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. Rav. 85 (1980); Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend
Policy, 67 VA. L. Ray. 699 (1981).
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firm encounters financial difficulties.40 As the possibility of insolvency grows,
the likelihood that shareholders will be able to invest the value of their
equity elsewhere for a greater return increases. As a result, the shareholders'
incentive to cause the corporation to make distributions increases at the
same time that the adverse impact of such transfers on creditors is magni-
fied.41 When the corporation's financial condition worsens, creditors there-
fore may become especially anxious to restrict this self-interested conduct
by the equity holders, and the conflict between creditors and equity holders,
with respect to distributions is heightened. Although a per se rule prohibiting
any distributions to shareholders if the firm had outstanding liabilities would
be overbroad, a per se rule which prohibits distributions when the corpo-
ration is insolvent or on the brink of insolvency reflects a determination
that under these extreme circumstances, the interests of the equity holders
and the creditors have become so divergent that the power of the equity
holders to control the corporation's decisions in this area should be circum-
scribed. 42 In recognition of this increased tension, "per se" rules embodied
in state corporation laws43 generally proscribe distributions to shareholders
under these circumstances.
From a creditor's point of view, a leveraged buyout is indistinguishable
from a distribution to shareholders. Although most analyses of leveraged
buyouts fQcus on the benefits accruing to management insiders who purchase
the company's stock in a leveraged buyout and the extent to which these
transactions carry a risk of unfairness to the selling shareholders, 44 in the
context of a leveraged buyout involving a financially troubled corporation,
the benefits to the selling shareholders which are, in effect, purchased at
the expense of existing creditors, cannot be ignored. As a result of the
leveraged buyout transaction, selling shareholders receive the cash proceeds
of borrowings secured by the corporate debtor's assets.
A leveraged buyout does not involve a debtor's decision to invest in a
new venture, new equipment or property. It is different, not just in degree,
but in character from the ordinary transfers and investment decisions made
by the corporate debtor's management. A leveraged buyout may in fact be
40. Smith & Warner, supra note 23, at 135. When the net present value of the firm's
anticipated earnings falls below the cost of external financing, as is likely to occur with a
seriously troubled endeavor, the interests of creditors and stockholders conflict directly "with
noninvestment and dividends promoting the stockholders' interests and retained earnings and
investment promoting the [creditors'] interests." Bratton, supra note 34, at 736.
41. Assuming an absence of legal constraint, under extreme circumstances "[t]here is no
easier way for a company to escape the burden of debt than to pay out all of its assets in the
form of a dividend, and leave the creditors holding an empty shell." Black, The Dividend
Puzzle, 2 J. PoRTouo MGmr. 5, 7 (1976).
42. See Williamson, supra note 37, at 1211-12.
43. See, e.g., Rnv. MODEL Bus. CoRP,. ACT § 6.40 (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. See also
infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 2.
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viewed as a corporate decision to invest its assets (by borrowing against
them) for the personal benefit of both the old and new equity owners.
Considered in this perspective, leveraged buyouts have something of a topsy-
turvy, Alice-in-Wonderland character in that the normal relationship between
a corporation and its equity owners, involving the owners' investment of
personal assets in the corporation, is inverted. In a leveraged buyout, a
corporation invests its assets to finance the equity owners' purchase of
control of the company's assets.
A per se rule which restrains an insolvent debtor from entering into a
leveraged buyout is not a rule which limits the debtor's general entrepre-
neurial decisionmaking. The risk posed to a creditor by a leveraged buyout
involving an insolvent debtor or a debtor who becomes insolvent or under-
capitalized as a result of a leveraged buyout is not simply the risk of a
debtor's bad business decision, but the risk of a transaction which benefits
the selling shareholders at the expense of a deeply indebted corporate entity
and its creditors. Professors Baird and Jackson's argument fails to acknowl-
edge the relevance of this latter type of risk to the determination whether
creditors would desire to apply the per se rules embodied in fraudulent
conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts. Professors Baird and Jackson
ignore the strong personal incentive that equity holders of a financially
troubled debtor will have to sell their interest in the company in a leveraged
buyout as a means of withdrawing their capital from exposure to total loss
in the event the company becomes bankrupt. Although the price paid to
the selling shareholders under such circumstances may not be very high, in
a typical leveraged buyout, the stock price may not reflect all existing debts.
In fact, the price the selling shareholders receive in a leveraged buyout may
often be higher than the price they would receive if they sold their interest
to a buyer who invested its own funds. In the course of a leveraged buyout,
the selling shareholders' equity interest, which represents a claim against
the corporate assets subordinate to that of the company's creditors, is not
just transferred but transformed into a claim which may take priority over
other debts of the company.
This priority may enable the seller to receive a premium over the price
which would have been paid in a non-leveraged acquisition in which the
buyer would only pay a price reflecting the value of the equity interest in
the company. Consider for example a leveraged buyout of a barely solvent
corporation. In such a case, the price to be paid may often be a function
of the amount a lender is willing to loan to finance the transaction rather
than the product of negotiations between buyer and seller. In making this
determination, a lender may have little concern with the amount of the
company's other debt. To the extent the leveraged buyout lender customarily
assumes a senior, secured position vis-a-vis other creditors, the buyout
lender's principal concern will be to assure that the company will be able
to repay the buyout debt. Thus, a leveraged buyout lender is not likely to
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be seriously concerned with the question whether the debtor is insolvent at
the time of the transaction or becomes insolvent as a result of the transaction
so long as the value of the assets pledged to secure the acquisition debt
appears sufficient to repay this debt in the event of default.
In the absence of constraints of the type provided by fraudulent convey-
ance laws, a leveraged buyout may be attractive to buyer, seller and third
party lender precisely because it allows all parties to the buyout to shift
some portion of the risk of loss associated with their investment in the
company to the only "investors" in the company who are not involved in
the buyout-the other creditors. It is only logical to suppose that rational
creditors will desire some form of protection from a transaction with such
strong lures to the equity holders and lender alike.
Although, as Professors Baird and Jackson suggest, a management buyout
of a public company may benefit a corporate debtor by reducing operating
costs associated with compliance with federal securities laws, 45 a creditor
may well be more concerned about other implications of a going private
transaction. A management buyout, for example, does not really give the
insolvent or near insolvent debtor "new" management; it simply alters the
relationship of those managing the debtor from the status of employee to
owner. Advocates of leveraged buyouts suggest that this change in status
may give managers increased incentive to operate the firm more profitably
and imply that creditors should therefore welcome the change 6 Although
much has been made of the enhanced management incentives and efficiency
expected to accrue to a company following a leveraged buyout as a result
of management's ownership of a more significant percentage of the new
venture's equity,47 this should not obscure the fact that the new shareholders'
45. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 853. Although reduction in securities reporting and
compliance costs is frequently cited as one of the motivations for leveraged buyouts of public
companies, in view of the transaction costs associated with large buyouts, it is unlikely that
this is a significant motivating factor in larger transactions. As Professor Lowenstein has
noted, "[s]urely, a billion dollar company does not go private in order to save legal fees and
the other routine expenses of having publicly traded securities. The fees and expenses in
connection [with a large leveraged buyout] would pay for a generation of compliance costs."
Management Buy-outs, supra note 1, at 743 (footnote omitted). See also Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. Rnv. 1019, 1032-34 (1975) (questioning whether reduction of
securities compliance costs is a legitimate motive even in smaller transactions).
46. See Small Leveraged Buyouts Are Big Business Now, Bus. WK., Dec. 10, 1984, at 140
(following a management buyout, "[m]anagement is simply more committed to the company").
47. See, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and
Stockholder Wealth, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 367, 371-74 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 706 (1982); Jensen & Ruback, The Market for
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FiN. EcoN. 5, 9-22 (1983). Wholly apart
from the particulars of any specific leveraged buyout transaction, the leveraged buyout boom
has been touted as a way to improve national economic performance by unleashing America's
entrepreneurial energies. As some have noted however, it seems implausible that the mere
change in an individual's status would alter individual productivity sufficiently to explain why
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total equity investment is generally quite small in proportion to the com-
pany's total capitalization. As noted above, a significantly increased debt
to equity ratio may increase management's propensity to engage in risky
endeavors" and thereby increase creditors' risk of loss.
Indeed, the extent to which the new owner-managers actually have an
increased personal stake in the corporation's financial success is debatable.
In a management buyout of a large public company, the value of the new
owner's equity investment in the surviving privately held corporate entity,
although representing a significant percentage of the company's equity
capital, may be a smaller percentage of an individual manager's personal
net worth than the amount the individual had previously invested in the
public company. 49 Thus, while the manager's control over the company's
management strategy may have been less complete in a publicly held venture
where he was accountable to a larger outside shareholder interest, the value
institutional lenders and investors are willing to pay such high premiums to acquire mature,
even mundane, businesses in highly leveraged transactions. See Management Buy-outs, supra
note 1, at 749; Sloan, supra note 1, at 41.
The argument that the buyout phenomenon represents a fundamental reorientation of the
American economy toward entrepreneurial ownership is also severely challenged by evidence
that many public companies which go private do not stay private for very long. Indeed in
many cases the return to public ownership is anticipated at the outset of the leveraged buyout
of a public company. In most larger leveraged buyout transactions, the financial plan anticipates
a substantial reduction in leverage during the first five to six years following the buyout. The
initial employment agreements which often assure management of extraordinary compensation
in the years immediately following the buyout often expire at about the same time. Thus, if
all goes as anticipated and the stock market appears favorable, it is highly likely that the
company will once again become publicly owned in less than a decade after the initial buyout.
Thus, even if private ownership brings with it the increased efficiencies and productivity which
advocates suggest, the nature of large leveraged buyouts suggests that these improvements are
likely to be short lived. Management Buy-outs, supra note 1, at 765-66.
48. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
49. Professor Lowenstein provides an interesting illustration of this phenomenon drawn
from the 1981 management buyout of Fred Meyer, Inc. Prior to the buyout, senior management
of the company owned approximately 1.6% of the equity. In connection with the buyout,
these shares in the original company were sold for approximately $5.5 million cash. Manage-
ment's stake in the new venture comprised 9% of the equity. This interest was purchased,
however, without any substantial investment of personal assets by the individual managers. At
closing, the managers actually purchased only about one-quarter of the shares they would
beneficially own; the balance of their equity interest took the form of stock options. The
consideration paid for the shares actually purchased at closing consisted of $3,000 cash and
almost $1.6 million in notes payable in installments beginning five years after closing. As a
result, following the buyout, the managers had received a substantial amount of cash from
selling their interest in the old company and did not put any significant portion of their
personal assets at risk in the new venture despite their substantial equity position in the new
company. Under such circumstances, the managers, while naturally hopeful that the new
venture will succeed (and that they will ultimately be able to sell their equity interest in the
new company for a sum sufficient to pay off their notes and still make a handsome profit)
have virtually nothing to lose should events prove otherwise. Management Buy-outs, supra
note I, at 745. Professor Lowenstein cites a number of other buyouts in which management,
despite receiving substantial sums as sellers of their equity interest in the old company,
reinvested very little in the new venture. Id. at 748 n.63.
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to him of his personal stake in the venture, may have been just as great or
greater.
A leveraged buyout may free management from the confines of a cor-
porate strategy dictated by public shareholders' demands for current high
earnings, but the enormous financial demands of the debt incurred in
connection with the buyout, despite the extraordinary tax advantages his-
torically associated with such transactions, may place similar constraints on
management's strategy.50 Leveraged buyouts do not, for example, ordinarily
free cash otherwise required for payment of dividends to be used for capital
expenditures required for expansion or modernization. Indeed, companies
with significant projected capital expenditures are generally considered poor
candidates for leveraged buyouts because the significant debt burden created
by the buyout would make it difficult to generate cash internally or to raise
from external sources the funds needed for capital expenditures.51 As yet,
the evidence appears insufficient to support a conclusion that leveraged
buyouts produce real economic gains in terms of corporate productivity or
management efficiency. 2 The improved financial results associated with
leveraged buyouts do not generally reflect increases in operating income but
are primarily a function of the fact that the buyout reorganizes the cor-
poration's capital structure so as to maximize the after-tax value of the
company's cash flow.53
In addition, a management buyout, by altering the creditor's debt rela-
tionship with a public company into a debt relationship with a private
venture may also remove other constraints and monitoring mechanisms54
which the creditor may have relied upon in constructing the terms of his
original relationship with the debtor. For example, the creditor may have
relied upon the required public proxy statement disclosure of management
compensation and transactions with directors. Of course, all of these effects
accompany any leveraged buyout and creditors would probably not want
to restrict all leveraged buyouts because of them. However, the limited
marginal category of buyouts involving insolvent entities, or entities which
become insolvent as a result of a leveraged buyout, involves a significantly
enhanced likelihood of a direct injury to creditors and a substantially more
50. As Professor Lowenstein observes, "[d]ebt-equity ratios of four to one, six to one,
and even higher may put a usefully cash-hungry wolf at the door, but they also imit flexibility."
Id. at 731.
51. See Adkins, supra note 10, at 34; Management Buy-outs, supra note 1, at 757-58.
52. Management Buy-outs, supra note 1, at 764-67.
53. Id. at 759-64.
54. Items 7 and 8 of Schedule 14A, which prescribes the information required in a proxy
statement of a public company subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, require disclosure concerning management experience and compensation and a
complete description of transactions between the company and directors, officers or members
of their families. See Regulation S-K, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 70,950, 71,041-44 (1988);
Exchange Act-Proxies, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,001, 24,038-40 (1988).
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serious conflict between creditors' interests and the interests of equity holders
who control the debtor's decision to enter into the transaction. A per se
rule restricting leveraged buyouts under these circumstances would appear,
therefore, to be entirely consistent with Professors Baird and Jackson's
guideline that such rules should affect only transactions that creditors would
almost always want to prohibit.
III. Tirm Risk OF ERROR iN DETERMINNG
INSOLVENCY AND FAIR CONSIDERATION
With respect to constructive fraud, the language found in fraudulent
conveyance statutes limits the application of such statutes to transactions
involving insolvent entities and a lack of fair consideration. Professors Baird
and Jackson argue that these limiting factors are insufficient to keep the
reach of the fraudulent conveyance statutes from being too broad because
of the uncertainty inherent in determining both insolvency and lack of fair
consideration.55 Although the risk of an erroneous determination with respect
to either of these matters is present whenever a court applies the constructive
fraud provisions of fraudulent conveyance statutes, Professors Baird and
Jackson conclude that this cost is not excessive if the fraudulent conveyance
statutes are narrowly limited to sham and gratuitous transfers. In the case
of the former, the costs associated with the risk of an erroneous determi-
nation of insolvency are offset by the fact that the challenged transaction
is often suspected of being animated by an actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors. Since the strong circumstantial evidence of an imper-
missible motive is the underlying reason for the application of the fraudulent
conveyance statute, and since transactions involving actual intent to defraud
may be invalidated under the statutes without any specific determination
that a debtor was insolvent or received less than fair consideration, the risk
of an erroneous determination of insolvency or fair consideration with
respect to such a transaction is thought acceptable.56
In the case of completely gratuitous transfers, there is of course no
difficulty in determining the value of the consideration received by the
debtor because by definition the transferror receives no consideration in
exchange for a gift.5 7 In addition, imposing the risk of an erroneous
determination of insolvency on the recipient of a gratuitous transfer might
be seen as an acceptable allocation on the grounds that as between the
55. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 840-42, 851.
56. Id. at 830-31.
57. Id. at 832.
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donee and the creditor who parted with value, the latter is to be preferred.58
Where a leveraged buyout is concerned, there is no greater risk of an
erroneous determination of fair consideration than in the case of a gratuitous
transfer. As Professors Baird and Jackson acknowledge, a leveraged buyout
involves a transaction in which the corporate debtor pledges valuable assets
"without getting anything in return" because the loan proceeds are used to
pay the selling shareholders. 59
It is true that there may be some indirect, intangible and, as noted above,
highly speculative benefits to the corporate entity itself resulting from the
transaction-that is, new management or new incentives for management
and decreased legal costs following a going private transaction. However,
it may be that under peculiar circumstances an outright gift by a debtor
may indirectly bring him rewards as well. For example, a gift to a customer
or client may indirectly improve a business relationship and ultimately
benefit the debtor. Nonetheless, these types of intangible benefits have not
generally been perceived as sufficient to remove a gift from the province
of fraudulent conveyance statutes. 60 With respect to the issue of allocating
58. Under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee bears the burden
of proof on the issues of insolvency and lack of fair consideration. See, e.g., In re Nacol, 36
Bankr. 566, 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Emerald Hills Country Club, Inc., 32 Bankr.
408, 420 (Bankr. S.D. 'Fla. 1983); In re Thames, 21 Bankr. 704, 706 (Bankr. S.C. 1981).
Under the UFCA as interpreted in a number of jurisdictions, different rules apply. In
Pennsylvania, for example, when a creditor establishes that the grantor was indebted at the
time of the conveyance, the burden of proof shifts to the grantee to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, either that the grantor was solvent at the time of the challenged transfer
and was not rendered insolvent thereby or that the grantor received fair consideration in
exchange for the value transferred to the grantee. Stinner v. Stinner, 446 A.2d 651 (1982); cf.
United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 576 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that
under Pennsylvania law, once a creditor shows that the conveyance was made without fair
consideration, the burden is on the transferee to prove that the debtor was solvent).
Other jurisdictions also shift the burden of proof or the burden of going forward with
evidence on the issues of fair consideration and insolvency to the transferee. See, e.g., In re
Colandrea, 17 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. Md. 1982) (Maryland law); In re Tabala, 11 Bankr. 405
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York law); Neumeyer v. Crown Funding Corp., 56 Cal. App.
3d 178, 128 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1976) (California law); Tri-State Vehicle Leasing, Inc. v. Dutton,
461 A.2d 1007 (Del. 1983) (Delaware law).
59. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 851.
60. See I.G. GLEN, supra note 21, § 264, at 451-52 (noting that where personal transfers
are concerned intangible valuables such as love and affection have not historically been deemed
to constitute valuable consideration for purposes of fraudulent conveyance statutes). See also
Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 243-45 nn.19, 20, 23 (1976). See also, e.g., United States v. West,
299 F. Supp. 661, 666 (D. Del. 1969) (natural love and affection is not fair consideration).
The fair consideration required to save a conveyance by an insolvent from the reach of the
fraudulent conveyance statutes is a more stringent requirement than that imposed by the
requirement of consideration in the law of contracts. This reflects the purpose of the consid-
eration requirement which is to protect against depletion of the insolvent's estate. Consideration
which will be of no value to the creditors is thus disregarded. See Carl, Fraudulent Transfer
Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 Am. BxAr. L.J. 109, 120 (1986); Comment, Good
Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Hxv. L. Ray. 495, 506 n.60 (1983).
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the risk of inaccuracy in determining insolvency in the context of a leveraged
buyout, there are a number of important per se rules which constrain a
corporation's conduct only under circumstances of insolvency. One example
is the restraints on stock dividends and repurchases contained in state
corporation laws. 6' The accounting in any particular circumstance may be
difficult, but as a practical matter many important types of debtor and
lender conduct and rights are determined by reference to the concept of
insolvency.
Professors Baird and Jackson do not suggest that there are any particular
factors which increase the risk of an erroneous determination of insolvency
or fair consideration in the context of the application of the fraudulent
conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts. As the discussion above indicates,
with respect to the cost, as distinguished from the likelihood, of such an
error, the social utility of leveraged buyouts appears sufficiently debatable
to counter any argument that the cost of an erroneous determination of
insolvency or fair consideration in connection with the application of
fraudulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts is simply unacceptable
as a matter of public policy.
IV. "ARMS-LENGTH" TRANSACTIONS AND CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
At bottom, Professors Baird and Jackson's argument against the appli-
cation of fraudulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyout transactions
rests on a perception that such transactions are "strikingly different" 62 from
61. See, e.g., RMBCA, supra note 43, § 6.40(c). After extensive consideration, the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws determined to retain in the Model Act both the equity and the
balance sheet tests for determining insolvency acknowledging that:
[w]hile there are sound arguments for the balance sheet test's elimination (many
of which center upon the soft, illiquid and oftentimes ephemeral character of
various types of assets that can be found on a balance sheet), the committee
believes that, in view of the difficulties frequently encountered in the practical
application of the equity insolvency test, the objectivity of the balance sheet test
and the demonstrability of compliance with it yield benefits that should be
preserved.
The Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendments Pertaining to Distributions, 42 Bus. LAw. 259 (Nov. 1986).
The New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) also retains both insolvency tests.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 643, 648 (1985). The use of the term
"balance sheet test" to refer to the definition of insolvency by comparison of a debtor's assets
and liabilities is somewhat misleading because it suggests the use of historical valuations-that
is, book value of assets as appearing on a corporation's balance sheet-while the fraudulent
conveyance statutes tend to value assets for purposes of determining insolvency by reference
to their current fair market or salable value. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) (referring to
the "present fair salable value" of the debtor's assets); UFTA § 2, 7A U.L.A. 643, 648 (1985)
(referring to the "fair valuation" of the debtor's assets). The courts have emphasized that this
value may be more or less than accounting book value. See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 833.
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the types of transactions historically affected by fraudulent conveyance
statutes. This perception appears to derive in part from a simple observation
that since leveraged buyouts have been so widely publicized and discussed
as a new phenomenon, these types of transactions simply couldn't have
been within the contemplation of the drafters of the original sixteenth
century statutes or in the minds of those who composed the UFCA in the
early twentieth century. According to Professors Baird and Jackson, the
only types of transactions, apart from transactions involving actual intent
to hinder, defraud or delay creditors, which were traditionally and legiti-
mately encompassed within the grasp of fraudulent conveyance statutes fell
within two distinct categories.
The first category consisted of sham transfers occurring under circum-
stances "in which the possibility of a deliberate effort to hinder, delay or
defraud was high." 63 Although the application of a constructive fraud rule
to these types of transactions may be overbroad in the sense that it may
sometimes result in the invalidation of transactions in which the debtor was
not actually trying to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, the rule is justified
on the grounds that with respect to these types of transactions "lt]he costs
to society of setting aside legitimate transfers should be offset by the
elimination of costs associated with proving actual fraudulent intent in cases
in which the chances of fraud are very high." 64 At its core, this category
of transactions would include those involving circumstances, such as intra-
family transactions, and conduct such as retention of possession, which,
prior to the inclusion of the constructive fraud provisions in the fraudulent
conveyance statutes, were historically considered to create a presumption of
fraud.61
63. Id. at 832.
64. Id. at 831.
65. Prior to the inclusion of specific statutory provisions dealing with transactions by
insolvents for less than fair consideration, most of the fraudulent conveyance statutes prohibited
only transactions undertaken with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. A significant
body of law relating to these statutes was concerned with matters of evidence concerning what
facts and circumstances would be deemed sufficient to create a presumption that a transaction
was motivated by the required intent to injure creditors. See 0. BUMP, BuMP ON FRAUDULENT
CoNvEYAcEs 31-59 (1872); McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 46 HAv. L. Rav. 404, 407-09 (1932-33). Circumstances such as inadequate or no
consideration and the debtor's retention of possession or substantial control over the property
were typically found to be "badges of fraud." The drafters of the UFCA intended the adoption
of the constructive fraud provisions to remove:
all possibility of a presumption of law as to intent .... Certain conveyances
which the courts have in practice condemned, such as a gift by an insolvent, are
declared fraudulent irrespective of intent. On the other hand, while all conveyances
with intent to defraud creditors ... are declared fraudulent, it is expressly stated
that the intent must be "actual intent," as distinguished from intent presumed
as a matter of law.
UFCA, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428 (1985) (Prefatory Note).
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A second category of debtor conduct the constructive fraud provisions
of the UFCA were intended to constrain, according to Professors Baird and
Jackson, consisted of donative transfers." These transfers were prohibited
not because it was believed that they were more often than not a smoke
screen for a debtor's intentional fraud, but because the drafters of the
statute found them to be "inherently objectionable." 6 7 This objection has
been explained as an essentially normative constraint on debtor conduct
designed to promote extensions of credit by giving primacy to obligations
derived from such relationships. By prohibiting gifts by insolvent debtors,
fraudulent conveyance statutes express society's directive to an insolvent to
be just before being generous." The prohibition of gifts is not targeted at
conduct which is suspected of being improperly motivated by fraud or deceit
and would therefore be objectionable under any circumstances.
In fact, this rule affects conduct which, under circumstances other than
insolvency, might be deemed quite socially desirable. The prohibition of
gifts merely bars those who are by definition incapable of satisfying all
their legal obligations from making gratuitous transfers. Although the
examples and cases cited most often to illustrate the application of fraudulent
conveyance statutes to gratuitous transfers by insolvent debtors involve gifts
to family members,69 these situations do not present an entirely clear picture
of the policy involved because these types of gifts inevitably raise the
question whether the debtor's apparent generosity may in fact mask some
self-interest. The prohibition of donative transfers by an insolvent applies
not only to bar gifts to the debtor's family and friends, but also prohibits
the insolvent from making a donation to the most laudable public charity.7-
For example, an insolvent's donation to the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals is just as voidable by his creditors as a gift to his
mother. This example illustrates more clearly the point that even though a
donative transfer might be the product of unsullied generosity and public
spirit and would be perceived as laudable behavior by the debtor if he were
solvent, once insolvent, certain types of behavior are restricted. Unlike the
first category of transfers affected by the constructive fraud provisions, the
prohibition of gifts, and the more general prohibition of transfers for
inadequate consideration which may be seen as partial gifts, is not justified
primarily by a focus on the inherently objectionable quality of the debtor's
behavior or by a presumption of collusion between debtor and transferee.
66. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 831-32.
67. Id. at 832.
68. I.G. GLENN, supra note 21, § 264, at 451. The phrase also appears without citation to
authority in Clark, supra note 20, at 510.
69. See, e.g., I.G. GLENN, supra note 21, §§ 264-264a, at 451-52; Clark, supra note 20, at
509-11.
70. I.G. GLENN, supra note 21, § 264a, at 452.
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Rather, this prohibition reflects a primary concern for the impact of the
transaction on creditors.71
Although Professors Baird and Jackson contend that leveraged buyouts
are "arms-length" commercial transactions which fall into neither of the
categories discussed above and thus should be excluded from the proper
scope of fraudulent conveyance laws, a close analysis of leveraged buyouts
involving insolvent or nearly insolvent corporate debtors suggests that such
transactions may be much closer in character to time-honored schemes to
defraud and to "gifts" than to ordinary arms-length transactions.7 2 Viewed
solely in terms of the lending transactions involved, it is true that the
leveraged buyout does not normally involve any special relationship between
the lender and the corporate borrower which would suggest that the transfer
involves the type of collusion traditionally policed by fraudulent conveyance
statutes. Nonetheless, the leveraged buyout has a significant potential for
self-interested misbehavior by the debtor, or to be more precise, for abuse
of the corporate form by the shareholders in control of the debtor's
conduct.7 3 In the course of a leveraged buyout the selling shareholders cause
the corporate debtor to act in such a way that they are personally benefitted
71. As Professors Baird and Jackson acknowledge, "[a] birthday gift of cash by an
insolvent debtor injures creditors just as much when his intentions are innocent as when they
are not, and one can presume creditors would ban them if they could." Baird & Jackson,
supra note 5, at 832.
72. Commentators have traditionally considered transactions involving transfers of corpo-
rate assets to shareholders, such as dividends, as comparably suspicious to intra-familial
transfers. See, e.g., I.G. GLmN, supra note 21, § 265a, at 454 (observing that from the
perspective of creditors, a gift by a natural person is identical to "the payment of dividends,
or distributions of capital, by an insolvent corporation"). Similarly, Professor Clark observes
that the prohibitions of gifts by an insolvent represents a determination that a debtor entity
(whether natural or legal person) has a "moral duty in transferring his property to give
primacy to so-called legal obligations, which are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of
standard contract and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, family, friends,
shareholders and shrewder or more powerful bargaining parties." Clark, supra note 20, at
510.
In a footnote Professor Clark notes that, in the context of a corporate debtor, fraudulent
conveyances of the sort under discussion may be buried amid obscuring factors and it thus
requires "judicial imagination to see through the disguises." Id. at 511 n.18. See also In re
Tri-State Paving, Inc., 32 Bankr. 2, 4 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that "[c]orporation-
director transfers are analogous to intrafamilia transfers: the relationship of the parties
encourages collusion and concealment").
73. In assessing whether transactions involving corporate as opposed to individual debtors
implicate the policies traditionally enforced by fraudulent conveyance laws, one should recall
Jensen and Meckling's observation that although the law considers a corporation a legal
person, the "personalization of the firm" can be an obstacle to understanding the motives
and dynamics of the firm's conduct. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24, at 311. "The firm is
not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which
the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may 'represent' other organizations)
are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations." Id. The legal
system and the per se legal rules operate to constrain the contractual freedom of the different
interested parties. Id. n.14.
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at the expense of the corporate entity and its creditors. The leveraged buyout
allows them to liquidate their investment in the operation without paying
off the corporation's creditors first, as would be required if the company
were liquidated.74
The traditional policies underlying fraudulent conveyance statutes are
entirely consistent with a per se rule which would prohibit those individuals
in control of the corporation, the equity holders, from causing the corpo-
ration to act in ways beneficial to themselves in preference to the payment
of obligations owed to the creditors of the corporation.75 Where an insolvent
corporation is involved, fraudulent conveyance statutes have traditionally
operated in conjunction with the statutory restrictions on distributions to
shareholders contained in state corporation laws to constrain corporate
transfers for the benefit of shareholders in preference to the discharge of
obligations owed to the corporation's creditors. 76 Although state corporation
statutes and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) have
recently moved toward the abandonment of the concept of legal capital
which traditionally limited the permissible sources of funds used to pay
dividends or other distributions to shareholders, corporation laws continue
to circumscribe a corporation's power to make any such dividends or
distributions, or to engage in certain other types of transactions in which
corporate assets are transferred to shareholders, under circumstances of
insolvency. 77 For example, under the RMBCA, a corporation is prohibited
from paying a cash dividend or making any other "distribution" to share-
holders if, immediately following the dividend or distribution, the corpo-
ration would be insolvent. The statute defines "distribution" to include the
transfer of money or other assets in connection with a repurchase and the
incurrence of indebtedness for the benefit of shareholders in connection
with a repurchase. 7 Thus, under the RMBCA a corporation could not
74. The basic ideal of fraudulent conveyance law commands those in control of a corporate
debtor to act so that transfers to shareholders do not disable a corporation from discharging
its obligations to its creditors. Clark, supra note 20, at 510 n.16.
75. As Professor Clark notes, these statutory restrictions on distributions to shareholders
are a "straightforward expression of fraudulent conveyance principles." Id. at 555.
76. Statutory restrictions on the payment of dividends based upon legal capital concepts
have, as a practical matter, traditionally provided creditors with little protection against self-
serving actions by shareholders because such constraints could easily be circumvented. See
RMBCA, supra note 43, § 6.40 Official Comment. See also Clark, supra note 20, at 555-57.
77. Section 6.40(c) of the RMBCA prohibits any distribution to shareholders if after giving
effect to the distribution the corporation would be insolvent applying either the balance sheet
or equity test.
78. Section 1.40(6) of the RMBCA defines "distribution" to include any:
direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares) or
incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its share-
holders ... [whether] in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend; a
purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of shares; a distribution of indebt-
edness; or otherwise.
RMBCA, supra note 43, § 1.40(6).
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simply sell or mortgage its assets for cash and use the proceeds to pay a
dividend to shareholders or to repurchase or redeem its shares if the
corporation was insolvent or became insolvent as a result. This type of per
se statutory restriction on the conduct of an insolvent corporate debtor
illustrates that while creditors generally are not protected against a corpor-
ation's decision to use its assets for distributions to shareholders, insolvency
triggers a per se rule aimed at protecting creditors against such transfers.
From the point of view of a corporation's creditors a leveraged buyout is
identical to such a share repurchase or redemption. In both cases, corporate
assets otherwise available for the payment of the corporation's debts have
been exchanged for cash which has been transferred to the shareholders. In
the course of these transfers, the corporation itself has received nothing of
tangible value.
Professors Baird and Jackson point out correctly that from the point of
view of a corporation's creditors a leveraged buyout is functionally indis-
tinguishable from the simple case in which the firm issues new preferred
debt and then uses the proceeds to pay a dividend to its shareholders. 9
They argue that this conduct is often restricted in credit agreements but
that if a creditor fails to restrict such conduct, there should be no per se
rule protecting his interest.8 0 This argument overlooks corporation law per
se rules that limit distributions to shareholders when the transaction involves
an insolvent corporation or a corporation that becomes insolvent as a result
of the transaction. Although the per se rules embodied in state corporation
laws would not bar an insolvent corporate entity from incurring new senior
debt, the distribution restrictions would prohibit the use of the proceeds of
this debt to pay dividends to shareholders. Thus, creditors do rely on per
se rules to protect themselves against these types of transactions when they
occur under circumstances most likely to cause serious injury to creditors.
The application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts
merely affords creditors an identical range of protection against the impact
of a functionally equivalent transaction.
A comparison of a leveraged buyout financed by a third party lender and
a corporate stock repurchase in which the corporation issues its notes as
consideration to the shareholders illuminates the degree to which a blanket
exception to the fraudulent conveyance laws for leveraged buyouts would
undermine the policies of creditor protection embodied in state corporation
laws. The fact that the leveraged buyout involves a sale of stock to new
shareholders, and not to the company itself, is not a significant distinction
between the two transactions because, by definition, in a leveraged buyout,
the new shareholders' equity investment is extremely modest by comparison
79. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 853.
80. Id. at 853-54.
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to the debt obligations incurred by the corporation in connection with the
acquisition. In the case of an installment stock repurchase, the RMBCA
provides that a corporation may not issue indebtedness to a shareholder in
connection with a stock repurchase if, as of the date the indebtedness is
issued, the company would be unable to satisfy the solvency tests set forth
in the statute.81 Applying fraudulent conveyance statutes to invalidate lev-
eraged buyouts involving financially troubled companies merely protects a
creditor from a transaction in which the corporation incurs a debt obligation
to a third party and the proceeds are immediately used to pay the selling
shareholders for their stock. From the perspective of a creditor, the trans-
actions are identical; they both involve a corporate debtor's incurring
additional debt solely for the purpose of allowing the shareholders to
liquidate their equity investment in the company. In both cases, debt replaces
substantial amounts of equity. The leveraged buyout is perhaps even more
injurious to existing general creditors because in the course of the leveraged
buyout, the equity is generally replaced by significant amounts of senior,
secured debt, whereas in the installment repurchase transaction, the claims
of the selling shareholders rank, under the RMBCA, in pari passu with the
claims of unsecured creditors.82
81. RMBCA, supra note 43, § 6.40. The statute contemplates one exception to this
prohibition. Section 6.40(g) of the RMBCA, added in late 1986, provides that in determining
the solvency of a corporation under the solvency tests set forth in section 6.40(c), indebtedness
of the company, including indebtedness issued as a distribution, is not considered as a liability
if the terms of such indebtedness provide thit payment of principal and interest are to be
made only if and to the extent that a distribution could then be made to shareholders under
section 6.40. Thus, under the RMBCA indebtedness could be issued to a shareholder in
connection with a repurchase even if the total amount of the deferred purchase price represented
by such indebtedness exceeds the net worth of the corporation, so long as the corporation is
obligated to make payments with respect to such indebtedness only if at the time of the
proposed payments, the corporation meets both the solvency tests included in the statutes.
The Official Comment indicates that this exception was designed to permit share repurchases
by "businesses in early stages of development or service businesses whose value derives
principally from existing or prospective net income or cash flow rather than from net asset
value." Where indebtedness is issued as a distribution under these types of circumstances, the
statute provides that each payment of principal or interest with respect to such indebtedness
shall be considered a distribution, and that the solvency tests shall be applied with respect to
each such distribution on the date the payment is actually made. The practical utility of the
kind of debt instrument contemplated by this statutory language seems highly questionable.
For a brief overview and discussion of section 6.40(g), see The Committee on Corporate
Laws, supra note 61, at 261, 267-68.
82. Section 6.40(f) of the RMBCA provides that indebtedness created to acquire the
corporation's shares or issued as a distribution is on a parity with the indebtedness of the
corporation to its general, unsecured creditors except to the extent subordinated by agreement.
The Official Comment to this section observes that under its terms:
[g]eneral creditors are better off in these situations than they would have been
if cash or other property had been paid out for the shares or distributed which
is proper under the statute [assuming, of course the solvency tests are met], and
no worse off than if cash had been paid out to the shareholders, which was then
lent back to the corporation, making the shareholders [or former shareholders]
creditors.
RMBCA, supra note 43, § 6.40(f) Official Comment 8(c).
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Although large scale leveraged buyouts may be a new financial phenom-
enon, these transactions are not significantly different from transfers his-
torically encompassed by fraudulent conveyance laws. Leveraged buyouts
enable the owners of a corporate debtor's equity to transfer the value of
the corporation's assets to themselves in preference to the claims of the
corporation's creditors. The traditional policies embodied in fraudulent
conveyance laws dictate the prohibition of such a self interested transaction
when the corporation is insolvent. Exempting leveraged buyouts of insolvent
corporations from the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes would
not represent a decision to restrain fraudulent conveyance laws to their
traditional domain. Such an exemption would instead represent an illogical
lacuna in the application of the statutes and create an irrational inconsistency
between fraudulent conveyance statutes and state corporation laws.
V. UNTED STATES V. GLENEAGLES: ILLUSTRATING A LEVERAGED
BUYOUT'S POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE TO CREDITORS
The degree to which a leveraged buyout involving a failing venture bears
all the indicia of a self-interested, creditor abusive transaction traditionally
constrained by fraudulent conveyance laws is vividly illustrated by the
transaction involved in United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co. 3 Gle-
neagles was a suit to enforce liens created as a result of delinquent federal
income taxes owed by Raymond Collieries Co., a Pennsylvania corporation
which, along with a number of wholly owned subsidiaries, was engaged in
coal mining and sales operations. Prior to the leveraged buyout described
below, Raymond Collieries was a closely held company owned by two
families, the Gillens and the Clevelands.Y4
Raymond Collieries' financial problems began shortly after its 1966 ac-
quisition of an anthracite subsidiary, Blue Coal Corporation. 5 In 1967,
Pennsylvania environmental authorities forced Blue Coal to begin a costly
process of converting its mining operations from deep mining to strip
mining. The costs of conversion, coupled with depressed conditions in the
83. The district court issued three separate opinions in United States v. Gleneagles Inv.
Co.: United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (Gleneagles I);
United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 571 F. Supp. 935, (1983) (Gleneagles II); United States
v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584 F. Supp. 671 (1984) (Gleneagles III). On consolidated appeal, the
Third Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part under the name U.S. v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F. 2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986).
For a complete chronology of the transactions giving rise to this complicated litigation, see
Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Life After Gleneagles,
43 Bus. LAw. 1 (1987).
84. Gleneagles I, 565 F. Supp. at 563.
85. The purchase price for Blue Coal was $6 million, of which Raymond paid $500,000 in
cash and delivered a note to the seller, Glen Alden Corporation, for the remainder. The note
was secured by a mortgage on the Blue Coal properties. Id.
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coal industry, created chronic financial difficulties for the Raymond com-
panies from the late 1960's through the early 1970's. s6 During this period,
Raymond Collieries and its subsidiaries were not only chronically delinquent
in the payment of trade accounts, but also seriously delinquent in the
payment of property taxes and federal income taxes.17 Throughout this
period, the companies suffered operating losses and relied upon income
from sales of surplus coal properties to fund operations." The deteriorating
financial condition of the Raymond companies led to friction among the
stockholders and in 1972 the Gillens and Clevelands decided to seek a buyer
for the companies. s9 The consolidated income statement for the Raymond
companies' fiscal year ended June 30, 1973, reflected a net loss of more
than $2 million °
In November 1973, the Gillens and Clevelands sold their stock in Raymond
Collieries to Great American Coal Company in a leveraged buyout. 91 As is
common in these types of transactions, Great American was a holding
company formed specifically to acquire the Raymond stock; Great American
had no assets or operations prior to its acquisition of the Raymond stock. 92
Institutional Investors Trust ("IIT"), a New York real estate investment
trust, provided $8.5 million in financing for the buyout. In connection with
the buyout, the Raymond companies were divided into two categories, the
"borrowing companies" and the "guarantor companies." 93 At the closing,
the borrowing companies received, albeit temporarily, $7 million94 in pro-
ceeds from the IIT loan and executed first mortgages on all their assets in
favor of IIT. The guarantor companies executed agreements guaranteeing
the repayment of the IIT loan by the borrowing companies and mortgaged
their assets to IIT to secure these guarantees. The loan agreement provided
additional security to IIT by a provision granting IIT a priority lien on any
proceeds received by any of the Raymond companies from land sales. 9 This
86. Id. at 564.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 565.
90. Id.
91. The transaction was a management buyout. James Durkin, Sr. who had been President
of Raymond Collieries for a number of years prior to the buyout owned 40% of the stock of
Great American. Teamsters union figure James R. Hoffa, Sr. held 50% of the Great American
stock and the remaining 10% was held by an investor recruited by Hoffa to help arrange the
loan for the transaction. The purchasers unsuccessfully sought to obtain financing for the
buyout from the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 566.
94. The remaining proceeds of the lIT loan were deposited in an "interest reserve account."
The funds in this account were to be used to pay the interest on the IT loan because it was
apparent to IT that the Raymond companies would not have sufficient income to cover the
debt service from operating revenues. Id. at 566, 574, 581.
95. Id. at 579-80.
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provision effectively deprived Raymond of the cash flow upon which it had
depended for working capital.
Immediately upon receipt of the proceeds of the IIT loan, the borrowing
companies transferred slightly more than $4 million of the money received
from IIT to Great American in exchange for Great American's promissory
note.96 Great American then used this $4 million, along with approximately
$3.5 million in additional funds borrowed by Great American and its
stockholders from other sources, to pay the Gillens and the Clevelands the
$7 million purchase price for the stock of Raymond Collieries. 97
Prior to the buyout, Raymond had outstanding approximately $8 million
dollars in delinquent obligations, including delinquent federal income tax
liabilities extending as far back as 1966, as well as delinquent property
taxes, pension fund obligations, and obligations owed to state mining
authorities for land reclamation and employee welfare funds.98 Although
some of these obligations were repaid at the time of the buyout, many
remained outstanding following the transaction. Following the closing, the
assets of the Raymond companies were charged with obligations totalling
approximately $20 million.9 The desperate financial situation of the Ray-
mond companies was apparently evident to all involved in the closing of
the sale of the Raymond Collieries stock to Great American. Pursuant to
last minute negotiations, the Gillens and the Clevelands agreed to use
$500,000 of the cash they received from the sale to make a loan to Raymond
Collieries in order to provide the company with minimal working capital.- 0
Nonetheless, the financial condition of the Raymond companies was so
poor in the immediate aftermath of the buyout that the companies were
unable to pay their utility bills. 01 The borrowing companies were in default
under the terms of the IIT loan requiring maintenance of specified ratio of
current assets to current liabilities from the date the loan agreements were
signed.' °2 Within three months after the buyout, all mining operations of
the Raymond companies ceased. Thereafter, the companies were engaged
in a de facto liquidation; their activities consisted solely of sales of coal
properties and mining equipment.103
The district court, applying the Pennsylvania fraudulent conveyance stat-
ute, which follows the UFCA and defines insolvency in terms of an excess
of liabilities over the "present fair salable value" of the debtor's assets,
concluded that the Raymond companies were rendered insolvent by the
96. Id. at 570.
97. Id. at 567, 578; Gleneagles II, 571 F. Supp. at 938-39.
98. Gleneagles I, 565 F. Supp. at 572.
99. Id. at 578.
100. Id. at 570.
101. Id. at 572.
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id. at 572.
1988]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
buyout transaction.104 Viewed from the perspective of the creditors who
were owed approximately $8 million by the Raymond companies at the time
of the leveraged buyout, the transaction had extremely adverse consequences.
Although the Raymond companies' financial condition was precarious prior
to the buyout, the facts found by the district court indicate that prior to
the buyout, revenue reasonably anticipated from land and equipment sales
might have been sufficient to pay off the companies' matured debts. 03 If
the Raymond companies had been liquidated at this point, the claims of
the companies' creditors might have been almost completely satisfied but
there would probably have been little or nothing remaining for the equity
holders.
By effecting a leveraged buyout, followed by the de facto liquidation of
the companies' assets, the equity holders' situation was improved dramati-
cally at the direct expense of the companies' creditors. The equity holders
received approximately $7 million in cash at the time of the closing of the
leveraged buyout; $4 million of this sum derived directly from the proceeds
of the IIT loan secured by a first lien on the Raymond companies' assets.'06
Under the terms of the loan agreement with IIT, proceeds received from
the sales of Raymond assets following the buyout were to be used to
discharge the indebtedness owed to IIT; an obligation incurred for the
benefit of the shareholders and not for the benefit of the companies. The
buyout produced exactly the type of situation the fraudulent conveyance
laws were designed to prevent. The transaction advanced the personal self
interest of the corporate debtor's shareholders and did so at the expense of
the corporation itself which was left unable to discharge its obligations.1,7
VI. REMEDmAL INCONGRUITIES: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
STATUTES AND THREE-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The conclusion that the application of fraudulent conveyance laws to
protect creditors against the adverse impact of a leveraged buyout is con-
sistent with the policies underlying the fraudulent conveyance statutes and
consistent with creditors' reasonable expectations does not fully respond to
all of the concerns underlying Professors Baird and Jackson's argument
that the fraudulent conveyance remedy is "needlessly crude."' °8 Even if one
104. Id. at 578-80.
105. The matured obligations of the Raymond companies prior to the buyout totalled
approximately $8,700,000. Id. at 578. The Raymond companies' equipment sales proceeds
following the buyout totalled $8,676,984. Id. at 582.
106. Id. at 570.
107. The court concluded that the transactions surrounding the leveraged buyout of the
Raymond companies violated not only the prohibitions of constructively fraudulent transfers
contained in the Pennsylvania fraudulent conveyance statute, 39 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 354,
355, but also the intentional fraud provisions contained in 39 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 357.
108. Baird & Jackson, supra note 5, at 843.
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were to conclude that leveraged buyouts are in fact the type of transactions
against which creditors generally expect to be protected by the application
of per se rules, there could be other reasons to limit the application of
fraudulent conveyance laws to these transactions. For example, if, under
the peculiar circumstances of a leveraged buyout the remedy prescribed by
fraudulent conveyance statutes carries a risk of producing a peculiarly
incongruous and inequitable result, one might well conclude that the cost
of protecting creditors against the adverse consequences of a leveraged
buyout by invalidating the corporation's obligations to the third-party lender
who financed the buyout was simply too high.
There are in fact important differences between the way in which the
fraudulent conveyance statutes remedy the adverse consequences of the
leveraged buyout as compared to the remedies applied by corporation laws
in the analogous situations discussed above. Although as noted above,
leveraged buyouts are analogous in their effect on creditors of the corpo-
ration involved in the buyout to other types of transactions which are
restricted by provisions contained in corporation laws, 109 such statutes rem-
' dy these comparable injuries by directly affecting the transfer of assets
from the corporation to the shareholders. Thus, in the example considered
above in which the proceeds of an issuance of preferred debt are used to
pay dividends, if the corporation were insolvent, the state corporation statute
would typically permit recovery from directors and shareholders of the sums
improperly paid as dividends but would not directly affect the validity of
the corporation's issuance of the preferred debt or the rights of the third-
party holders of such debt. 10 By contrast, the application of fraudulent
conveyance statutes to the loans made by third-party lenders in leveraged
buyout transactions brings with it a remedy which imposes the cost of
redressing the injury to the corporation's net worth on the third-party
lender.
The reason for this difference between the way in which related per se
rules remedy the injury done to the creditors may best be understood by
noting that the dividend restrictions and related constraints contained in
state corporation laws operate on two-party transactions-the transfer of
assets directly from the corporate entity to the shareholders. By contrast, a
typical leveraged buyout involves multiple parties-the selling and buying
shareholders, the corporate entity whose stock is involved in the transaction,
and the leveraged buyout lender.
109. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., RMBCA, supra note 43, § 8.33 (providing that directors who vote for or
assent to a distribution made in violation of section 6.40 shall be personally liable to the
corporation for the sums improperly distributed). Under the RMBCA, directors held liable for
an unlawful distribution may seek contribution from any shareholder who accepted the
improperly distributed amounts while "knowing" that the distribution violated the statute. Id.
§ 8.33(b). See also Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 172, 174.
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The fraudulent conveyance remedy is essentially a prescription for rescis-
sion but it does not contemplate a multi-party, as distinct from a two-party,
transfer. In the case of a simple exchange between two parties, the fraudulent
conveyance remedy of invalidating a transfer made by the debtor remedies
the injury done to the debtor's creditors by cancelling the unjust enrichment
of the transferee. Thus, in the classic situation in which an insolvent or
nearly insolvent debtor simply gives property to another, the transfer is
voided in its entirety and the property (or the value of the property)
recovered for the benefit of creditors of the transferor."' Under the circum-
stances of a simple two-party transfer, the remedy of invalidating the transfer
and any accompanying obligation incurred by the debtor, works equitably
to place both parties in exactly the same position they occupied before the
transfer." 2 By contrast, in a multi-party transaction such as a leveraged
buyout, simply invalidating the corporation's obligation to the leveraged
buyout lender may not always place all the parties in the position that they
would have occupied had the fraudulent transfer not occurred.
In a simple two-party exchange the debtor is injured precisely to the
extent that the transferee is "unjustly" enriched. By contrast in a multi-
party transaction such as a leveraged buyout, the injury to the debtor's
estate occurs not because the lender/transferee receives a value in exchange
for the loan proceeds which exceeds the value of those loan proceeds-that
is, not because the lender gets something for nothing-but because the
debtor does not receive the value of the consideration provided by the
lender in exchange for incurring the obligation to the lender."' Unlike the
111. Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers the trustee to "avoid" fraudulent
conveyances with the result that the transferee is defeased of his claim to the property. Section
9 of the UFCA provides a creditor having a matured claim the right to "[h]ave the conveyance
set aside . . . to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim" or to "[d]isregard the conveyance
and attach or levy upon the property conveyed." 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). The UFTA,
authorizes a creditor to "recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred ... or the
amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less." UFTA § 8, 7A U.L.A.
643, 662 (1985). When a transfer is made for inadequate, as opposed to no, consideration the
remedy is appropriately limited. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c)(1982). Section 9(2) of the UFCA limits
the remedy of a creditor in a similar manner and allows the transferee who acted in good
faith to retain the benefit of the transfer to the extent of value given to the debtor. UFCA
§ 9(2), 7A U.L.A. 427, 578 (1985). Section 8(d) of the UFTA provides that a good faith
transferee is entitled to retain the benefit of the challenged conveyance to the extent of the
value given to the debtor. UFTA § 8(d), 7A U.L.A. 643, 662 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Newman v. First Nat'l Bank of East Rutherford, 76 F.2d 347 (3rd. Cir.
1935); Damazo v. Wahby, 305 A.2d 138, 142 (Md. Ct. App. 1973) (relief from fraudulent
conveyance should place injured creditor " 'in the same or similar position he held with respect
to the fraudulent transferor prior to the fraudulent conveyance' " (quoting Miller v. Kaiser,
164 Colo. 206, 210, 433 P.2d 772, 775 (1967))); 0. BUMP, supra note 65, at 485 (the purpose
of avoiding a fraudulent conveyance is to restore the parties to their original position).
113. The fraudulent conveyance problem presented by a leveraged buyout is thus analogous
to that presented by corporate guaranties. In the case of an "upstream" or "cross-stream"
guaranty, a corporation incurs an obligation to a lender, but the proceeds of the loan are
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two-party transaction in which the debtor is injured precisely to the extent
that the lender is unjustly enriched, in a three-party transaction it is the
third party, (the third party in the case of a leveraged buyout being the
shareholders, both the buyers and the sellers) who is the principal beneficiary
of the debtor's conveyance to the lender. It is the shareholders, not the
lender, who receive the benefit of the corporation's transfer to the lender.
In short, in this three-party transaction, it is not the leverage but the
buyout that produces the adverse impact on the corporation's net worth
and causes the injury to the creditors. By permitting the imposition of the
costs of remedying the injury suffered by creditors on the third-party lender,
the application of fraudulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts could
theoretically produce a result which is at odds with the basic restitutional
premise of the statute. When the transactions comprising a leveraged buyout
are viewed in isolation and the transfer of the loan proceeds to the
shareholders is considered apart from the loan transaction, the application
of the fraudulent conveyance laws to invalidate the security interest held by
the lender and any accompanying obligations owed to it could result in
leaving the parties to the loan transaction in circumstances quite different
from those they were in prior to the buyout. Ignoring the possible avenues
available to the corporation and the lender for recovery of the sums received
by the shareholders, 114 the application of the fraudulent conveyance statutes
to invalidate the obligations and security interests held by the lender appears
to run the risk of unfairly penalizing the lender and creating a potential
windfall for the parties whose conduct is perhaps most suspect-the share-
holders.
received by the corporation's parent or affiliate. Thus, the corporate guarantor fails to receive
"fair consideration" for incurring the obligation and if the guarantor is insolvent the guaranty
may be deemed a fraudulent conveyance. The application of fraudulent conveyance laws to
corporate guaranties has been the subject of an extensive literature. See Carl, Fraudulent
Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BAKR,. L.J. 109 (1986); Coquillette,
Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation,
30 CASE W. Rns. 433 (1980); Littman, Multiple Intent, Veil-Piercing, and Burdens and Benefits:
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Multiparty Transactions, 39 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 307 (1984);
Ragusin, Brother Sister Corporate Guaranties: Increased Legal Acknowledgement of Business
World Realities, 11 J. CoRp. L. 391 (1986); Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the
Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. Rnv. 235 (1976); Note,
Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 194 (1986);
Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HAgv. L. Rv. 495 (1983); Comment,
Avoidability of Intercorporate Guarantees Under Sections 548(a)(2) and 544(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 64 N.C.L. Rnv. 1099 (1986).
114. Sums transferred to selling shareholders in connection with the buyout might be
recovered on behalf of the corporation pursuant to state corporation laws. See supra note
107. Creditors of the company might also seek to recover these sums from the selling
shareholders under the fraudulent conveyance statutes. See, e.g., In re Anderson Indus., 55
Bankr. 922 (W.D. Mich. 1985). As a practical matter, remedies directed at recovery of sums
from the selling shareholders are likely to prove impractical where a large publicly held concern
is involved and inadequate even in many cases involving buyouts of privately held companies.
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Consider for example a not implausible scenario in which the leveraged
buyout lender is by far the most significant creditor of the insolvent
corporation. Invalidation of the obligation owed to this lender could produce
a situation in which the assets in the debtor's estate are more than sufficient
to pay all other claims. Under such circumstances, if the lender has no
claim against the residual assets of the company and this value is paid to
the equity holders, the result would be bizarre and entirely inconsistent with
the restitutional premise underlying the fraudulent conveyance remedy.
The generally equitable character of the fraudulent conveyance remedy is
illustrated by statutory provisions which preserve the transferee's right to
retain in part a fraudulent transfer or obligation to the extent the debtor
received value from the transferee and the transferee was found to have
acted in good faith. Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
a transferee or obligee ... that takes for value and in good faith ...
may retain any interest transferred, or may enforce any obligation
incurred, as the case may be, to the extent that such transferee or
obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or
obligation.'-
Responding to concern that the application of fraudulent conveyance statues
to invalidate an obligation to a third-party lender incurred in connection
with a leveraged buyout could produce inequitable results, Professor David
Carlson has argued that this statutory good faith defense should be appli-
cable to a third-party leveraged buyout lender who transfers loan proceeds
in good faith even where the loan proceeds are not received by the corpo-
ration which is the target of the buyout. 116 This argument treats the explicit
language of the statute which requires that the value given by the transferee
be "received by the debtor" as a "drafting error." 1 1 7 The rationale given
for disregarding this express requirement is twofold. First, Professor Carlson
argues that this particular phrase does not appear in the analogous section
of the UFCA and therefore should be disregarded in the interests of
construing the trustee's remedy under the Bankruptcy Code as consistent
with that available under state law." 8 This reasoning appears to overlook
the fact that although the "received by the debtor" language does not
appear in the UFCA, courts and commentators addressing this analogous
section have consistently understood it to require that the debtor receive
the benefit of the value exchanged by the transferee."19 Thus, if one assumes
115. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982).
116. Carlson, supra note 1, at 86-89 (stating that "the LBO lender who acts in good faith
should have a defense against fraudulent conveyance attacks").
117. Id. at 86.
118. Id. at 86-87.
119. See I.G. GItEN, supra note 21, at 473 (stating that "a consideration which by the very
nature of the transaction does not pass into the estate at all, is not fair value"). In cases
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that the intent of section 548(c) was to create a remedy essentially congruent
with that available under the UFCA, the addition of the phrase "received
by the debtor" is entirely consistent with that purpose.
Professor Carlson also argues that the phrase "received by the debtor"
should be ignored because if the requirement were applied, parties to a
leveraged buyout could always take advantage of the section 548(c) defense
merely by structuring the buyout so that the proceeds of the loan passed
through the hands of the target entity on their way to the shareholders.'12
For example, assume that the buyout is structured so that the loan proceeds
are paid directly to the purchasing entity-usually a holding company formed
expressly for this purpose-with the target company providing guarantees
of the new parent's debt secured by pledges of its assets to the lender. Since
the target entity never received any of the proceeds, the defense provided
by these types of statutory provisions would not be available. This type of
transaction is, however, essentially identical to one in which the loan is
made directly to the target entity which then, as in Gleneagles, advances
the funds in the guise of a loan, a dividend or stock redemption to finance
the sale and purchase of the target company's stock.
Professor Carlson argues correctly that there should be no difference
between the application of the fraudulent conveyance laws to these two
different structures. To treat them differently would, as he suggests merely
"create a trap for the unwary. 12 1 But in concluding that the defense
provided by section 548(c) and the UFCA would be available to the lender
in the latter circumstance he is assuming, erroneously, that the courts will
and should give the lender the benefit of this defense if the loan proceeds
merely pass through the target entity even if the proceeds are not used for
the benefit of the entity but merely to finance a change in equity ownership.
In applying fraudulent conveyance statutes to transactions involving cor-
porations and insiders such as shareholders and directors, courts look to
involving guaranties, courts applying section 67(d) of the old bankruptcy law which did not
explicitly refer to consideration "received by the debtor," refused to consider the lenders
advance of loan proceeds to the principal obligor as constituting fair consideration with respect
to a guarantor. The courts allowed the lender to enforce the guarantee obligation against the
guarantor or its assets only when the court could find some benefit to the guarantor itself or
when, through an analysis similar to that used in cases involving the alter ego doctrine, the
court concluded that the affairs of the principal obligor and the guarantor were so commingled
that their separate legal existences should be disregarded, thus sums received by the obligor
were considered to result in benefit to guarantor. See, e.g., Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust
Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959); Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir.
1958); Mandel v. Scanlon, 426 F. Supp. 519, 523-24 (W.D. Pa. 1977); In re Winslow Plumbing,
Heating and Contracting Co., 424 F. Supp. 910 (D. Ct. 1976); McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F.
Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.N.Y. 1968); Hofler v. Marion Lumber Co., 233 F. Supp. 540, 543
(E.D.S.C. 1964).




the substance, not the formal structure of the transaction.'" Gleneagles
itself illustrates that in view of the fact that the determination that a transfer
is a fraudulent conveyance rests on the damage done to the debtor's net
worth and thus to its creditors, the court will find that the debtor received
value only when that value is retained in or used for the benefit of the
debtor's estate. The actual structure of the leveraged buyout in Gleneagles
was one in which the loan was made directly to the acquired entity and
this entity in turn lent the proceeds to the acquiring entity, receiving in
return a note from the purchaser.123 Since the acquiring entity had no assets
and no source of income other than the assets and revenues to be derived
from its ownership of the company being acquired in the leveraged buyout,
this note was worthless to the acquired entity.'2 The court concluded that
the target company's temporary receipt of the loan proceeds could not be
considered receipt of fair consideration for the challenged transfer to the
leveraged buyout lender.'25 The Gleneagles transaction illustrates that courts
are unlikely to exalt form over substance in applying the fraudulent con-
veyance laws to leveraged buyouts. Since under any transaction structure,
the receipt of the loan proceeds by the target will be virtually simultaneous
with the distribution of those proceeds to the shareholders for the purpose
of effecting the transfer of the company's stock, the ephemeral presence of
the loan proceeds in the debtor's hands is unlikely to be deemed receipt of
the proceeds for purpose of satisfying the statutory requirements that the
debtor receive fair consideration.
The purpose of section 548(c) and similar provisions contained in state
fraudulent conveyance laws is to avoid an inequitable or punitive result on
the transferee in a two party context. These provisions assure that in the
absence of an intentionally fraudulent transfer, the recovery of the injured
creditors is limited to the amount necessary to restore the debtor's estate
to its status quo prior to the injury caused by the fraudulent transfer. 2 6
122. See, e.g., In re Checkmate Stereo and Electronics, Ltd, 9 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. N.Y.
1981) (where challenged transfer is only a step in a larger transaction, transaction must be
viewed as an entirety with all of its implications in assessing impact on creditors); Arnold v.
Dirrin, 398 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. App. 1979) (series of contemporaneous transactions considered
single transfer for purpose of applying fraudulent conveyance statutes).
123. As the district court noted the IIT loan proceeds "merely passed through the borrowers
to Great American and ultimately to the selling stockholders and cannot be deemed consid-
eration received by the borrowing companies." Gleneagles I, 565 F. Supp. at 575.
124. Since covenants contained in the IIT loan documents restricted the payment of dividends
by Raymond Collieries until such time as the IIT loan was repaid, Great American in fact
had no source of income until the IIT loan was repaid and had no way to repay the note
given to Raymond Collieries. Id. at 571.
125. Id. at 575.
126. See Clark, supra note 20, at 516. Clark states-
[I]t does not seem unduly harsh to ask an innocent transferee to disgorge the
amount by which he has beat the market when he paid less than fair value for
transferred property, given that the transferor's innocent creditors would otherwise
lose that amount, to go further would be punitive and unfair.
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When, for example, a transferor grants a lender a security interest far in
excess of the value necessary to secure the amount of a loan, or pays an
inflated price for property, these provisions expressly permit the transferee
to retain the security interest or the purchase price to the extent the lien or
the purchase money constitutes fair consideration for what the debtor
received. Under these circumstances, the transferor and its creditors are in
fact injured only to the extent the value transferred to the transferee exceeds
that received by the transferor, and the transfer is invalidated only to that
extent.
These statutory provisions contemplate a direct exchange between two
parties and their application in the context of a three-party transaction such
as a leveraged buyout would be incongruous. Assuming there is no inde-
pendent question concerning whether the value of the security interest
granted by the target was substantially in excess of the loan proceeds, to
assume that these provisions would apply to leveraged buyouts would not
mean that the leveraged buyout financing would be only partially as opposed
to totally invalidated, but would mean that so long as the value of the lien
was not unreasonable as compared to the size of the loan, the lender would
retain its claim in its entirety, even though the debtor's estate had not
received any tangible benefit from the loan proceeds. These sections are
designed to assure fairness to the transferee where the debtor received some
value in exchange for the challenged transfer and the transaction actually
injured creditors only to the extent of a discrepancy in value between that
which the debtor transferred and that which it received. These provisions
are not meant to protect a transferee in the context of a three-party
transaction merely because, in exchange for the challenged transfer by the
debtor, the transferee gave value to a third party. In this circumstance, the
debtor gets nothing and is injured to the full extent of the transfer it makes
to the transferee, even though the transferee is not unjustly enriched.
To the extent one takes the position suggested above-that the constructive
fraud provisions of the fraudulent transfer statutes do in fact have as their
proper domain prohibition of transfers which adversely affect the net worth
of an insolvent or which render a previously solvent debtor insolvent-one
must take as a corollary the position that the remedy resulting from the
application of fraudulent conveyance statutes must be consistent with this
purpose. That is to say, the remedy should be an equitable one designed
to place the parties to the transfer in the position they would have occupied
had the improper transfer not occurred. If the invalidation of the leveraged
buyout lender's claim under the fraudulent conveyance statutes produces a
result which runs the risk of unjustly enriching the shareholders involved
in the buyout and imposing an inequitable loss on the lender, such an
incongruous and inequitable result might warrant excepting these transac-
lions from the scope of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. Such an excep-
tion involves, however, a significant cost in terms of creating a loophole in
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a web of statutory protections generally afforded to creditors of insolvent
corporate entities. This cost is justifiable only if the cost of potential inequity
to the lender is deemed to be unavoidable.
In fact, that is not the case. Professor Carlson's tortured construction of
section 548(c) is all the more unpersuasive because it is unnecessary to
ignore the plain language of this statutory provision to avoid a result which
might unjustly enrich the shareholders of the company at the expense of
the third party leveraged buyout lender. There is ample authority to support
a bankruptcy court's power to assure that the fraudulent conveyance remedy
produces an equitable result in the context of a leveraged buyout transaction.
Fraudulent conveyance statutes have traditionally invalidated fraudulent
transfer only to the extent necessary to remedy the injury.127 Fraudulent
transfers are voidable at the insistence and for the benefit of the grantor's
creditors. They are not void as between grantor and grantee.'2 Thus,
invalidation of a fraudulent conveyance for the benefit of creditors does
not rescind the transfer insofar as the parties to the conveyance are con-
cerned. As between the grantor and grantee, the grantee retains his interest
in the transferred property.1 29 Where the fraudulently transferred property
is sold to satisfy the claims of the defrauded creditors, it is the grantee who
retains the equitable right of redemption and in the event there is any
surplus remaining from the proceeds of the sale after satisfying the creditors'
claims it belongs to the grantee.130
127. See A/S Kreditt-Finans v. Cia Venetico De Navigacion, 560 F. Supp. 705, 711 n.15
(E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1446 (3d Cir. 1984) (creditor must be injured by the conveyance
it seeks to invalidate). Where the state fraudulent conveyance remedy is involved, an injured
creditor is generally permitted to set aside a conveyance only to the extent necessary to satisfy
his own claim. See also In re Swan-Finch Oil Corp., 279 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Buckley Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Goldman, 28 A.D.2d 640, 641, 280 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1967).
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), empowers a
trustee to set aside a fraudulent transfer in toto for the benefit of all creditors of the estate
even though the creditor to whose rights the trustee is subrogated may have had only the right
to avoid the transaction in part under state law.
128. See 0. BUMP, supra note 65, at 443 (fraudulent conveyance statutes are "designed
solely to protect the rights of creditors and, consequently, it renders a fraudulent transfer void
only as against them, and makes no provision whatsoever in regard to its effect between the
parties"); I.G. GLENN, supra note 21, § 114, at 225 (a transfer made in fraud of the donor's
creditors is good against the donor and his privies, a fraudulent conveyance is actually a
conveyance with all the natural consequences); Kirby, McGuiness & Kandel, Fraudulent
Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. LAw. 27, 31 n.18 (1987) (stating
that "as between the debtor and his transferee or obligee, the transfer or obligation is valid").
See also Drake v. Thompson, 14 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 744 (1926);
Ahmanson Bank & Trust Co. v. Tepper, 269 Cal. App. 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1969); Stratton
v. Edwards, 174 Mass. 374, 54 N.E. 886 (1899); Delgado v. Delgado, 42 N.M. 528, 82 P.2d
909 (1938).
129. A creditor's judgment subjecting property fraudulently conveyed by the debtor to the
payment of the debt does not have the effect of revesting title in the fraudulent grantor. West
v. Baker, 109 Ariz. 415, 510 P.2d 731 (1973); Meletio Elec. Supply Co. v. Martin, 437 S.W.2d
927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
130. See Pacific Fin. v. Donald, 286 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (excess in value of
[Vol. 63:781
LE VERA GED B UYO UTS
Thus, the "windfall" problem is really illusory. A determination that the
financing transactions associated with a leveraged buyout violated the fraud-
ulent conveyance statutes does not deprive the leveraged buyout lender of
any claim against the estate of the bankrupt corporation. Under traditional
fraudulent conveyance principles, a leveraged buyout lender will retain a
claim against any assets of the corporate debtor remaining after payment
of the obligations owed to other creditors.' The result is analogous to the
application of the doctrine of equitable subordination. Where for example,
shareholders or former shareholders assert claims against the corporation
as creditors with respect to indebtedness issued by the corporation in
connection with a redemption or repurchase of stock, a bankruptcy court
may subordinate such claims to the claims of other creditors. The analogy
demonstrates again that to create a blanket exception to the fraudulent
conveyance statutes for leveraged buyout transactions would create an
anomalous loophole in the legal doctrines of creditor protection.3 2
CONCLUSION
There is no sound reason for courts to create a blanket exception to the
fraudulent conveyance laws for leveraged buyouts. The application of fraud-
ulent conveyance statutes to leveraged buyouts does not represent an exten-
sion of these statutes beyond the original policies served by the prohibition
the property fraudulently conveyed over the debts properly chargeable against the same passes
to vendee and not vendor); 0. Bump, supra note 65, at 448-50 (the right to redeem property
sold under an execution belongs to the grantee and not to the debtor; any surplus remaining
after the satisfaction of an execution belongs to the grantee); 37 Am. Jun. 2d, Fraudulent
Conveyances § 111 (1968) (as between a fraudulent grantor and grantee, it is the fraudulent
grantee who is entitled to any excess in the property over and above the amount necessary to
satisfy the creditors).
The doctrine of Moore v. Bay, discussed supra note 126, does not render this rule inapplicable
in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Moore empowers the trustee to invalidate the
fraudulent conveyance on behalf of all creditors of the estate and in this respect the fraudulently
conveyed property may be considered to become property of the estate for purposes of
satisfying those creditors' claims. However, nothing in the doctrine of Moore suggests that in
the event the estate is not entirely depleted by payment of these claims, the original debtor-
transferor would recover title to the remaining assets as against the transferee.
131. The holding in Gleneagles is not to the contrary. Although the Third Circuit invalidated
the mortgage liens associated with the leveraged buyout of the Raymond Collieries in their
entirety, this ruling was premised not on the fraudulent conveyance laws but on section 9-504
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The district court found that the foreclosure sales of the
Raymond properties were commercially unreasonable sales of collateral. The Third Circuit
held that under Pennsylvania law such a sale creates a presumption that the indebtedness was
completely extinguished. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3rd
Cir. 1986).
132. See Kirby, McGuiness & Kandel, supra note 128, at 31 n.18 ("mhe fraudulent
transferee or obligee should have precedence over the shareholders of the debtor to distributions
from the debtor's estate.... T]he principal sanction imposed against the fraudulent transferee
or obligee should be subordination to claims of other creditors.").
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of fraudulent conveyances. Where corporate debtors are concerned, the
application of fraudulent conveyance laws to leveraged buyouts serves as
an essential complement to the statutory protections afforded to corporate
creditors by restrictions on shareholder distributions contained in the cor-
poration laws. Unless one is prepared to argue for the abolition of statutory
restrictions on distributions to shareholders as inconsistent with creditors'
desires and best interests, there is no reason to believe that creditors do not
consistently and rationally desire to limit leveraged buyouts of insolvent or
nearly insolvent companies. Whatever the evidence may ultimately indicate
concerning the economic benefit of leveraged buyouts generally, the limited
marginal categories of buyouts involving financially ailing ventures, and of
buyouts of otherwise healthy companies which are so highly leveraged in
the course of the buyout as to threaten the company's solvency are probably
not so beneficial that the traditional policies of creditor protection embodied
in the fraudulent conveyance laws should be sacrificed.
